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U.S. officials have campaigned since late 2001 for antiterrorism measures
novel to the United States; specifically, for the indefinite and incommunicado
detention of presumed terrorists, a handful of whom might one day stand
trial before tribunals fashioned to avoid acquittal. The campaign to uproot
U.S. legal tradition was fronted for years by the Executive.' The Supreme
Court, though it placed significant checks on the executive plan, nonetheless
gave sanction to some aspects; 2 the campaign won further endorsement when
Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 3 There has, of course,
been opposition. Criticism of the curtailment of liberties came from a host of
human rights and legal organizations, from judges, legislators, and others,
within and outside America. But the press of the campaign often pushed
critics solely to react, to explain why an isolated initiative was wrong rather
than to put forward a full picture of previous practice and present options.
This Article endeavors to paint more of that picture. In so doing, it
demonstrates that reinforcement of an established, two-pronged policy-

1 See, e.g., Military Order-Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War

Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Presidential Order].
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (invalidating military commission as
established by Presidential order and ensuing regulations); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(holding that noncitizen detainees at Guantinamo could pursue litigation in U.S. courts, yet
reserving decision on scope of rights susceptible to litigation); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 432 U.S. 507
(2004) (concluding that a U.S. citizen could be held as an "enemy combatant," but only after
judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention). See also Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649
(2006) (declining to review enemy combatant detention of another U.S. citizen following his
transfer to the custody of the civilian courts to await trial on federal criminal charges); Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (deciding initial petition of same detainee had been improperly
filed).
2

3 Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948, 950, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006).
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called here, with a nod to Foucault, "punish or surveil"--is the present
option that promises best to protect both individual rights and national
security.
The Article begins by describing previous practice and evaluating in light
of earlier practice the campaign launched after September 11, 2001. It
focuses on punishment, the first prong of the policy long used to combat
threats against the United States. Ordinary civilian and military courts stood
ready to punish persons found guilty at public trials that adhered to fairness
standards, and national security interests not infrequently were advanced
through such courts. That is not to say that courts were the government's
only option. When it deemed judicial mechanisms unable to protect state
security-on account, for example, of its unwillingness to disclose secrets of
state-the Executive resorted to surveillance, the second prong of established
policy. Americans were led to understand that U.S. intelligence agents ever
were engaged in keeping their eyes open for inchoate threats, gathering
information as threats took shape, and, at times, acting in secret against
those threats.
As for present options, the Article finds implicit in executive innovations
an assertion that the September 11 attacks proved the two-pronged policy
inadequate. A new need thus is said to require blurring the line between
punishment and surveillance. Though new for the United States, such
blurring has been a hallmark of others' antiterrorism measures, among them
the Diplock system employed by Britain during its Troubles in Ireland. By
such measures detention no longer is a way to secure presence for trial or
absence from battle until war ends, but rather a way to assure custodial
interrogation unfettered by the niceties of legal process. Legal process itself
is diluted: in the case of the United States, newly minted military
commissions may convict detainees based on statements elicited not by law
enforcement agents schooled in Miranda,5 but by intelligence officers less
encumbered by constraints against coercion.

4 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, SURVEILLER ET PUNIR: NAISSANCE DE LA PRISON (tditions Gallimard

1975). The title's first word typically is translated "discipline," the English term proposed in the
1970s by the renowned French social theorist himself. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON, at ix (Alan Sheridan trans., 1979). But "surveil" sounds
equally apt to the ears of Twenty-First Century Americans served daily a menu of televised
police dramas. Cf. Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for
CollaborativeLawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395, 408 n.33 (preferring to translate surveiller as
"oversee"). In any event, it is "surveillance" that is under review in this Article, which does not
claim to engage in any systematic manner with the work of Foucault.
5 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to advise suspects of their rights
during custodial interrogation); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (holding that the
rule of Miranda is grounded in the Constitution). But cf. United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F.
Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (adjusting Miranda in the context of extraterritorial
interrogations).
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This Article takes issue with the premise that the attacks of September
11 exposed elemental defects. It contends, rather, that the existing twopronged system worked, accommodating interests to protect both human and
state security. Perceived difficulties in cases like that of erstwhile enemy
combatant Jos6 Padilla reveal improper use of established policy, not a need
for wholesale disestablishment of that policy. The government's third-prong
option, moreover, does not improve on the established regime. The Executive
itself admits that few of the 700 persons who have suffered detention at
Guantinamo posed a grave threat to national security. Yet the very existence
of the camp gravely harms the global standing of the United States. The fiveyear-old plan for military commissions has not yielded the conviction after
trial of even one person; its sole, dubious achievement has been to strip the
mantle of legitimacy from the government's preferred means of punishment.
Also of concern is the injury done to intelligence activities. By opening the
courtroom door to cross-examination of once-covert techniques, and by
pushing openly for wider surveillance even within U.S. borders, the
Executive well may have shrunk the scope within which intelligence agents
operate. This consequence likewise leaves the United States less secure than
it was under the established punish-or-surveil regime.
I.

PAST PRACTICES AND PRESENT OPTIONS

Obscured in debates surrounding post-September 11 innovations is the
antiterrorism framework in place before that date. According to that
framework, persons against whom the government had sufficient,
publishable evidence were punished following conviction at trials that
satisfied due process. Punishment occurred even for offenses that implicated
national security--offenses classified in some instances as contrary to the
laws of war, in others, simply, as contrary to the laws of the United States.
Laws were applied to combatants and civilians, to Americans and nonAmericans. A principal means of recourse was the civilian system of criminal
justice. The other was U.S. military justice, which comprehended courtsmartial and, on occasion, military commissions. All these mechanisms
operated within constitutional constraints respecting jurisdiction and
process. But the plan put in motion after September 11 departed from this
framework, opting for a novel system of detention and military commissions
that stood at odds with accepted fairness standards.
A. Jurisdictionto Punish
The Constitution apportions responsibilities for U.S. armed forces, for the
conduct of war, and for the punishment of certain crimes among the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. Article I grants to
the Congress the power to, inter alia: "define and punish Piracies and
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Felonies committed on the High Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
Nations";6 "declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water";7 "raise and support
Armies"; 8 "provide and maintain a Navy";9 "make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"; 10 "provide for calling forth the
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions";" and "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the
Militia."1 2 In turn, Article II sets forth the powers and duties of the head of
the executive branch: 'The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States";1 3 shall have the
"Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
15
Treaties";' 4 and shall "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."'
Finally, Article III grants jurisdiction to review disputes "arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties," 16 "in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." 17 The Constitution further authorizes recourse to
habeas corpus, a centuries-old writ "throwing its root," as the Supreme Court
has written, "deep into the genius of our common law."' 8 With regard to this
process by which the courts are obligated to examine the lawfulness of

6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.10.
7Id. at cl. 11.
8 Id. at cl. 12.

9Id. at cl. 13.
10 Id.

at cl.14.

11U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.15.
12 Id. at cl. 16.
13Id. at art. II, § 2, cl.1.

14Id. at art. II, § 2, cl.2.
15Id. at art. III, § 3.
16U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
17Id. at art. II, §1.
18 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (quoting Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 484, n.2 (1945)

Frankfurter, J., dissenting (citation omitted)).
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executive detention, the Constitution provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it."19 By the broader doctrine of
judicial review, moreover, federal courts may invalidate any governmental
action that violates the Constitution. 20 This network of rights and duties has
governed the scope of jurisdiction of each of the punishment mechanisms
under review.
1. Courts-Martial
In their struggle for independence from the British Crown and in
21
subsequent armed conflicts, Americans have subscribed to the laws of war.
President Abraham Lincoln asked a law professor named Francis Lieber to
draft a code for proper conduct of war. Issued on April 24, 1863, in the middle
of a bloody and protracted conflict, were a set of instructions usually referred
to as the Lieber Code. 22 Lieber was a Kantian who had served in the
Prussian Army during the Napoleonic Wars and whose sons fought on either
side of America's Civil War. 23 His landmark code remains an "extraordinarily
enlightened" application of reciprocity and humanity-principles that
animate contemporary humanitarian law-to international and to irregular
wars. 24 The code proclaimed that military law must "be strictly guided by the
principles of justice, honor and humanity-virtues adorning a soldier even
more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his

19U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.2.
20See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21 On American observance of the laws of war, see, e.g., JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND

THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMs 54 (1975) (American Revolution and Civil War); Geneva
Conventions for the Protectionof War Victims: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
84th Cong. 5-6, 10 (1955) (Korean conflict of the 1950s); U.S. Military Assistance Command for
Vietnam, Directive No. 381-46, Annex A (Dec. 27, 1967), reprinted in Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 754, 766-67 (1968) (Vietnam
conflict of the 1960s); James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War
on Terror, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 499 n.10 (2006) (American Revolution and thereafter).
22Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Order No.
100 (1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
23Theodor Meron, FrancisLieber's Code and Principlesof Humanity, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
269, 277 (1997); see also Scott Horton, Francis Lieber, General Orders No. 100 and the Kantian
Foundations of American Military Doctrine (unpublished manuscript presented at conference
entitled Jurisprudence and The War on Terror on April 22, 2006), available at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/jurisprudence.
24

Id.
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arms against the unarmed." 25 Just treatment was to be preferred in order to
expedite "[t]he ultimate object of all modern war": "a renewed state of
peace. ' 26 Virtually all captives were to be considered prisoners of war,
detained humanely, and, eventually, exchanged for captives held by the
enemy. 27 The code thus admitted no justification for "cruelty"-a term that
encompassed "torture to extort confessions"-even against captured
enemies. 28 As for criminal trials, the Lieber Code provided that cases
governed by statutory law were to be tried by courts-martial. 29 It allowed
other cases to be tried by military commission, but only if the commission's
proceedings conformed to "the common law of war."30 Later codifications of
U.S. military law, among them the Articles of War, applied during the two
World Wars, 31 built upon the foundation established by the Lieber Code.
That code likewise formed a cornerstone of international humanitarian law,
including the Geneva Conventions of 1949.32

25 Lieber Code, supra note 22, art. 4.

26THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, at x (Dietrich Schindler & Jill Toman eds., 3d ed., 1988)
(citing Lieber Code, supra note 22, art. 4 and explaining that the laws of war advance "mutual
interest" and "understanding after the end of the conflict").
27 Lieber Code, supra note 22, at art. 75 ("Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or
imprisonment such as may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to be
subjected to no other intentional suffering or indignity.'); see also id. at arts. 49-50, 105-10, 11934, 153.
28 Id. at art. 16. See id. at art. 56 ("A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for being a

public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering,
or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.")
and art. 80 ("Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giving to the enemy information
concerning their own army, and the modern law of war permits no longer the use of any violence
against prisoners in order to extort the desired information or to punish them for having given
false information."); see also id. at arts. 73-79, 153.
29Lieber Code, supra note 22, at art. 13.
3oId.
31Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593 (1916), cited in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946).
32 See Meron, supra note 32, at 277. Concluded at Geneva on Aug. 12, 1949, were: Geneva
Convention Relative to the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention Relative to the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (1949) [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; and Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. All four entered into force internationally
on Oct. 21, 1950, and as to the United States on Aug. 2, 1955. When the newborn Republic of
Montenegro became the 194th state party, the four conventions became the first treaties "in
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Applicable today is the Uniform Code of Military Justice, typically called
the UCMJ, codified at Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The Supreme Court has
written that this code came about after "objections and criticisms lodged
against court-martial procedures in the aftermath of World War II" led
Congress in 1950 to pass legislation designed "to reform and modernize the
system-from top to bottom." 33 Thus the statutes that compose the UCMJalong with the Constitution, case law developed in the military and civil
courts, and detailed regulatory law such as the Manual for CourtsMartial34-- now govern the conduct of American courts-martial. This
ensemble of sources has given rise to a military justice system in which
procedural and evidentiary rules largely conform to those that prevail in civil
35
courts in the United States.
Included within the UCMJ are procedures for arrest and detention,
nonjudicial punishment for minor offenses, investigation, and procedures
before and during trial by court-martial. The "Punitive Articles" detail
offenses that fall within the jurisdiction of the UCMJ, ranging from drunken
driving and crimes against property, to a host of crimes against the person,
such as rape, assault, and murder, to crimes of particular relevance to the
military mission, such as desertion, dereliction of duty, unlawful detention,
espionage, cruelty and maltreatment, and "conduct unbecoming an officer
and a gentleman." 36 The UCMJ does not detail war crimes with the
specificity of, to cite one example, the Statute of the International Criminal
Court; nor does the UCMJ mention international offenses such as genocide

modern history" to win universal approval. Int'l Comm. for the Red Cross, Geneva Conventions of
1949
Achieve
Universal
Acceptance
(Aug.
21,
2006)
http://www.icrc.orglWeb/Eng/siteengO.nsflhtmlall/geneva-conventions-news-210806.
33 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1953). Accord Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,
2789 (explaining that some innovations in the UCMJ and in the Third Geneva Convention came
"[alt least partially in response to subsequent criticism" of the post-World War II trial by U.S.
military commission of Japanese General Yamashita, discussed infra text accompanying note
78).
- MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (2005) [hereinafter MANUAL]. Article I of the Constitution
grants Congress power not only to legislate on military matters, but also to assign responsibility
for promulgating military regulations to the President. In turn, the President may delegate this
responsibility to officials within the executive branch. See 10 U.S.C. § 121 (2007) (granting the
President discretion to "prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties"
related to the armed forces). It is well settled that ensuing regulations, no less than statutes
passed by Congress, constitute laws of the United States; as such, they are subject to review by
the courts. Gratiot v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 80, 117 (1845); see also Johnson v. Yellow
Cab Transit, 321 U.S. 383, 390 & n.10 (1944); Standard Oil Co. of California v. Johnson, 316 U.S.
481, 484 (1942); United States v. Freeman, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 556, 567 (1845).
35 See infra text accompanying notes 202-36.
36 See Uniform Code of Military Justice §§ 77-134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (2007).
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and crimes against humanity. 37 Rather, it is the practice of U.S. military
prosecutors to levy charges based on an assessment of underlying conduct.
Thus someone suspected of brutality likely would be charged with "assault,"
which is enumerated in the UCMJ, rather than "torture," which is not.38 A
catchall "General Article" permits prosecution for crimes that the UCMJ does
39
not enumerate.
It is not only American servicemembers who may be called to account
before the courts-martial of the United States. Also subject to the UCMJ are
"[p]risoners of war in custody" of the U.S. military.40 Treatment of the latter
is set forth in Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees. 41 Jointly published by
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, "[t]his regulation implements
international law, both customary and codified"-including Convention (No.
III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the third of the four 1949
Geneva Conventions. 42 AR 190-8 extends the competence of American courtsmartial to anyone "who, while engaged in combat under orders of his or her
government, is captured by the armed forces of the enemy."43 After setting
forth a non-exhaustive list of examples of such "enemy prisoners of war," AR

37 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 32/A/CONF.

183/9 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
38 See

10 U.S.C. § 928.

3910 U.S.C. § 934.
Though not specifically mentioned in this chapter, all disorders and neglects
to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of
a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses
not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be
taken cognizance of by a general, special or summary court-martial, according
to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the
discretion of that court.
Id. For an illustration of how this methodology might be applied in a case alleging that a U.S.
service member abused detainees, see Maj. Martin N. White, Charging War Crimes: A Primer for
the Practitioner,ARMY LAWYER 1 (Feb. 2006).
40 10

U.S.C. § 802(a)(9).

41Army Regulation 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and

Other Detainees, para. 1-1(b)(1997), available at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/rl9O_8.pdf
[hereinafter AR 190-8].
42 Id.,

para. 1-1(b)(1997) (listing among the relevant codifications the Third Geneva Convention,
supra note 32).
43 Id. at 33 (definition of "enemy prisoner of war").
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190-8 requires that doubts concerning a detainee's status be resolved,
according to prescribed procedures, by a "competent tribunal" of three
military officers. 44 The same paragraph states that the detainee "shall enjoy
the protection" of the Third Geneva Convention until this tribunal makes its
decision. 45 The Convention makes clear that a sentence will be valid "only if
the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the same
procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power, and if, furthermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been
observed." 46 In conformity with this provision, AR 190-8 specifies that anyone
entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war ordinarily will be tried by a courtmartial that adheres to the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial.47 In a
case involving alleged violations of the law of war, therefore, an enemy
prisoner of war and a U.S. servicemember alike would be called to appear
before a general court-martial reserved for the most serious offenses. 48 The
sole permissible alternative forum is a "civil court"; however, the regulation
makes clear that an enemy prisoner of war "will not be tried by a civil court
for committing an offense unless a member of the U.S. Armed Forces would
49
be so tried."
2.

Civilian Courts

A person who is suspected of a crime but is not prosecuted within the
parameters of the UCMJ still might be haled before the ordinary criminal
courts of the United States. Such persons might include not only certain
enemy captives, but also relatives who live with a servicemember on a
50
military base.

44 Id. at para. 1-6.
45

Id.

46 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 32, at art. 102.
47 AR 190-8, supra note 41, para. 3-7(b).

See Uniform Code of Military Justice §§ 16-20, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-20 (2007) (describing three
types of courts-martial, "general," "special," and "summary").
48

AR 190-8, supra note 41, para. 3-7(b). U.S. servicemembers have been tried in ordinary
criminal courts only with regard to offenses that took place off base and had no connection to the
military, and even then only if the military declined to exercise its own jurisdiction to prosecute
and the civilian authority consequently chose itself to prosecute. Given the military's interest in
conduct related to armed conflict, there is little chance that these conditions would be satisfied in
a case involving violations of the laws of war.
49

50 Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that the Constitution

forbids peacetime
prosecution of civilian wives of servicemembers for crime committed overseas and punishable by
death). Ordinary criminal courts also have been the locus for prosecution of private military
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The civilian courts of the United States are competent to adjudicate the
gamut of offenses-from minor infractions to crimes punishable by deathenumerated in the U.S. Code. This is true even if the offense alleged occurs
outside the United States, provided the court first determines that Congress
intended the criminal jurisdiction of the United States to extend, for the
particular offense at issue, beyond U.S. territory. 51 Decades ago that proviso
might have operated to thwart many efforts to exercise extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The pertinent Restatement, published by the American Law
Institute in 1987, stated: "It is generally accepted by enforcement agencies of
the United States government that criminal jurisdiction over activity with
substantial foreign elements should be exercised more sparingly than civil
jurisdiction over the same activity, and only upon strong justification. 5 2 This
changed with the waging throughout the latter part of the Twentieth
Century of the so-called "war" against drug trafficking and other
transnational crimes. U.S. courts tended to find in some criminal statutes an
implied congressional intent to reach acts abroad; in some statutes, Congress
made this intent explicit. 53 Today federal prosecutors routinely prosecute
persons, citizens and non-citizens alike, for offenses that occurred, in full or
in part, outside the United States.
Among these prosecutions have been several cases that arose out of or
touched upon armed conflict or the use of force. Among the most famous
involved General Manuel Antonio Noriega, who was Panama's de facto ruler
in the late 1980s. A federal grand jury in the United States indicted Noriega
in February 1988 on ten counts relating to drug trafficking. In December

contractors alleged to have committed crimes in time of conflict. E.g., Scott Shane, CIA
Contractor Guilty in Beating of Afghan Who Later Died, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2006, at A6
(reporting that a federal jury convicted David A. Passaro, a contractor whom the Central
Intelligence Agency had employed in 2003 as an interrogator in Afghanistan, of three counts of
simple assault and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, for which he faced up
to eleven-and-a-half years in prison). A little-noted attachment to a 2006 spending law would
change that by allowing courts-martial of such contractors. Whether the new provision will
survive legal challenge, however, remains much in doubt. See Griff Witte, New Law Could
Subject Civilians to Military Trial, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2007, at Al.
51See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v.
Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990).
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

403, n.8 (1987).

53See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (sustaining conviction under
statute that expressly prohibits traveling abroad to engage in sex with minors); United States v.
Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1990) (inferring intent to apply child pornography statute
outside U.S. borders and holding that the exercise of such jurisdiction did not violate the
Constitution), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 826 (1990); United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134 (5th Cir.
1980) (deciding similarly with respect to drug-trafficking statute). The frequent judicial
willingness to infer extraterritorial intent recently was rejected by one court-notably, the
civilian court that reviews convictions by courts-martial. United States v. Martinelli, 62 M.J. 52,
56-58 (C.A.A.F. 2005).
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1989, Noriega declared that a state of war existed between Panama and the
United States; days later, U.S. military forces were deployed to Panama,
where they engaged in combat resulting in casualties and property loss.
Noriega soon surrendered and was transported to the United States to stand
trial in an ordinary criminal court. Eventually he was convicted of most of
the charges against him and sentenced to consecutive terms totaling forty
54
years in a civilian prison. This judgment was sustained on appellate review.
While Noriega's case was unfolding, many persons accused of hijacking
and other acts of terrorism stood trial in U.S. criminal courts. Among these
defendants were persons charged with the bombings of the World Trade
Center in New York in 1993 and of two U.S. embassies in East Africa in
1998. 5 5 In the hijacking cases in particular, the U.S. Code's description of
certain offenses reflected similar codifications in multilateral treaties to
56
which the United States had adhered.
Also during the 1980s and 1990s, Congress enacted three statutes
designed to give internal effect to other U.S. treaty obligations. Each
expanded the jurisdiction of U.S. courts over crimes of international concern.
The first of these enactments was the Genocide Convention Implementation
Act of 1987, passed at the same time that the United States ratified the
Convention Against Genocide. 57 This Act applies to anyone, "whether in time
of peace or in time of war," if "the offense is committed within the United
States" or "the alleged offender is a national of the United States."5 8 The
national statute's definition of genocide is almost identical to that found in

54 This account is derived from the judgment in United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th

Cir. 1997).
55See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003) (regarding bombing of the World Trade
Center); Benjamin Weiser, 4 Are Sent to Life in Prison in 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at Al.
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (affirming the conviction
against a Lebanese man who hijacked a Jordanian jet in Beirut and seized hostages, and noting
that Congress passed two of the statutes under which he was prosecuted to give effect to U.S.
obligations under the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 18, 1979,
18 I.L.M. 1456, and the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192); see United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (relying on the same Hague Convention to interpret a federal anti-hijacking statute,
and thus confirming the conviction of a Palestinian man for hijacking an Egyptian jet and
holding hostage passengers, including some Americans), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 834 (1998).
56

57 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-93 (1988); see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of

Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, entered into force Jan. 12, 1951, entered into
force as to the United States Nov. 25, 1988 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
58 18 U.S.C. § 1091(a), (d).
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the international convention. 59 A federal court may sentence a person
convicted of genocide to a fine of up to $1 million and imprisonment of up to
twenty years, or, if the conduct resulted in death, to the death penalty or life
60
imprisonment, plus a fine of up to $1 million.
The second such statute was enacted in 1994 to give internal effect to the
ratification by the United States of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 61 The statute
applies to anyone who is a national of the United States or is present in the
United States and who "commits or attempts to commit torture," but only if
such conduct occurred "outside the United States." 62 This limitation on the
statute's scope reflects the position of the United States that its laws already
prohibit all conduct within its borders amounting to torture, so that there is

59 Compare id., § 1091(a):
[W]ith the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such, the person
(1) kills members of that group;
(2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group;
(3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of
the group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques;
(4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the
physical destruction of the group in whole or in part;
(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group; or
(6) transfers by force children of the group to another group; or attempts to do
so ....
with Genocide Convention, supra note 57, at art. II (proscribing same acts, though omitting the
adjectives "specific" and "substantial"). On the import of these differences, see Diane Marie
Amann, Dialogueentre chercheurs de diffdrentes traditionsjuridiques: Une perspective amdricaine
[Dialogue Among Researchers from Different Legal Traditions: An American Perspective], in
VARIATIONS AUTOUR D'UN DROIT COMMUN [VARIATIONS AROUND A COMMON LAW] 363, 369
(Mireille Delmas-Marty, Horatia Muir-Watt & H6lne Ruiz Fabri eds., 2002).
60 18 U.S.C. § 1091(b). Conviction for "directly and publicly incit[ing]" others to commit genocide

is punishable by a fine of up to $500,000 and five years in prison. Id. § 1091(c).
61 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340B; see Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman,

Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, Annex, Supp. No. 51, at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) (adopted Dec. 10, 1984, entered into force June 26, 1987, entered into
force as to the United States Nov. 20, 1994) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
62

18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a), (b).
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no need for additional regulation of conduct inside its territory. 63 The statute
defines torture as an "act committed by a person acting under the color of law
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
person within his custody or physical control." 64 The crime is punishable by a
fine and imprisonment of up to twenty years or, if the torture caused death,
by the death penalty or imprisonment "for any term of years or for life." 65
The third and last of the statutes that expanded U.S. criminal
jurisdiction was the War Crimes Act of 1996.66 This Act applies when either
the accused or the victim "is a member of the Armed Forces of the United
States or a national of the United States." 67 It proscribed "war crimes," a
term initially defined as certain acts listed in the Annex to the Hague
Convention IV of 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, as
well as "grave breaches" and certain other violations of Geneva conventional
law to which the United States is a party. 68 For the most part, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 govern the conduct of armed conflict between two or
more parties, even if some participants in the conflict are not parties to those
conventions. 69

63See John B. Bellinger III Delivers Opening Remarks at the U.N. Committee Against Torture,
EMEDIAMILLWORKS POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, May 10, 2006, available at EMEDIAPT 18:23:00. But
see COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, ADVANCE UNEDITED VERSION, CONSIDERATION OF REPORTS
SUBMITTED BY STATES PARTIES UNDER ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONVENTION, § 19, at 5,
CAT/CIUSA/CO/2, May 18, 2006, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/
AdvanceVersions/CAT.C.USA.CO.2.pdf (urging the United States to "adopt clear legal provisions
to implement the principle of absolute prohibition of torture in its domestic law") [hereinafter
CAT Recommendations].
64 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). In contrast, Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture, supra note 61,
requires that the harm be inflicted for certain purposes, such as extraction of information.
6518 U.S.C. § 2340A(a).
66War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).
67

Id. § 2441(b).

68Id., § 2441(c) (referring to the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and its annex: Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 3 MARTENS
NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 3) 461, 187 Consol. T.S., ratified by the United States Nov. 27, 1909,
entered into force Jan. 26, 1910).
69See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 32, at art. 2:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
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Common Article 3 is an exception, for it obligates parties to adhere to
certain "minimum" guarantees even when they are engaged in "armed
conflict not of an international character." 70 Specifically, it requires that
"[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities," including former
combatants in detention, "shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,"
and it prohibits subjecting such persons to "[v]iolence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture," to
the "[t]aking of hostages," to "[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment," or to "[t]he passing of sentences and
the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 71 U.S. law incorporated
these obligations, in that the War Crimes Act explicitly "define[d] as a war
crime any conduct which constitutes a violation of common Article 3."72 The
Act stated that commission of any offense it enumerated would be punishable
by a fine or by imprisonment for "life or any term of years" or, "if death
73
results to the victim," by the death penalty.
Despite the availability of these statutes, federal case law reveals not one
reported instance in which a person was convicted for violating any of the
newly enumerated crimes. The first indictment for a violation of the 1994
statute proscribing extraterritorial torture was returned in December 2006

The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance.
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in
their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in
relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions
thereof.
The same language is common to Article 2 of all four conventions concluded at Geneva on Aug.
12, 1949.
70 See

71

id., at art. 3.

Id.

7218 U.S.C. § 2441(c)(3). The sentence concluded by referring to violations of "any protocol" to the
Geneva Conventions "to which the United States is a party and which deals with noninternational armed conflict .. " Id. On Dec. 12, 1977, the United States signed the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609,
entered into force Dec. 7, 1978 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; it has not, however, ratified
that protocol.
7318 U.S.C. § 2441(a).
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74
against the U.S.-born son of former Liberian President Charles Taylor.
Federal civilian prosecutors, no less than their military justice counterparts,
seem to prefer to employ more familiar, domestic statutes-assault rather
than torture, for instance.

Ordinary criminal courts have served, however, as a forum for the
adjudication of certain post-September 11 cases involving offenses against
Americans. John Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Taliban," received a
twenty-year sentence after pleading guilty to aiding the Taliban and carrying
explosives. 75 Briton Richard C. Reid is serving a life sentence after pleading
guilty to an attempt to ignite bombs hidden in his sneakers during a Paris-toMiami flight. 76 American Jos6 Padilla awaits trial before a criminal court,
having been returned to federal custody in 2005, more than three years after
the Executive first placed him in incommunicado military detention as an
"enemy combatant." 77 In May 2006, a federal jury rejected prosecutors'
request for the death penalty and instead approved a sentence of life without
parole for Zacarias Moussaoui, a Frenchman who had pleaded guilty to a
conspiratorial role in the attacks of September 11.78 Along with Lindh, shoebomber Reid, and the leader of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
Moussaoui remains incarcerated at the United States' Supermax prison in
Colorado.79

74 David Johnston, Son of Liberia's Ex-Leader Charged In Miami Under Anti-Torture Law, N.Y.

TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at A5 (reporting that the indictment alleges that the son engaged in torture
during interrogation of political opponents in Liberia's capital, and that the father himself awaits
trial by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a hybrid tribunal established by agreement between
Sierra Leone and the United Nations).
75 Dean E. Murphy, American Taliban Soldier Seeks Less Prison Time, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,

2004, at A6. Cf. Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: PerspectivesDerived
from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL 5 (2005) (warning that
overuse of the statute employed by the prosecution in this and other post-September 11 cases
would undermine the traditional requirement of proof of mens rea as an essential element of
conviction for any crime).
Pam Belluck, Unrepentant Shoe Bomber Is Given a Life Sentence For Trying to Blow Up Jet,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2003, at A13.
76

77See Jay Weaver, Trial of Terror Suspect PadillaDelayed until April, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 13,

2007, at B3; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Decline Terrorism Case of a U.S. Citizen, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2006, at Al (discussing Padilla's enemy combatant detention). Padilla's case is discussed
further infra text accompanying notes 269-88.
78 Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui's Move to Recant Guilty Plea Is Denied, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at
A18; Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Given Life Term by Jury Over Link to 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2006, at Al; Moussaoui Tells Court He's Guilty of a TerrorPlot, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at Al.

79See Moussaoui Is Delivered to Prisonin Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, at 24; Richard A.

Serrano, Release of Lindh again urged, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, at A19; Richard A. Serrano, The
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3.

Military Commissions

Since September 11 the United States has availed itself little of military
and civilian jurisdictions when dealing with allegations of anti-American
violence. Prosecutions in ordinary federal courts have been few, and not one
suspected enemy combatant has been tried within the ordinary system of
courts-martial. The Executive preferred, rather, to relegate captives to what
one official labeled "a new legal regime." 80 Key components were indefinite
executive detention and a system of special tribunals, known as military
commissions, at which selected detainees were to be tried. This regime held
sway until June 29, 2006, when the Supreme Court, by its decision in the
case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, invalidated the Executive's military
commissions. The judgment in Hamdan has proved a watershed in U.S.
policy respecting post-September 11 detainees, and this and subsequent
discussions of the commissions are divided accordingly.
a)

Pre-Hamdan

President George W. Bush launched the initiative on November 13, 2001.
Declaring that "an extraordinary emergency . . . for national defense
purposes" necessitated extraordinary treatment of any noncitizen whom he
should determine belonged to al Qaeda or was somehow involved in "acts of
international terrorism" harmful to U.S. "citizens, national security, foreign
policy, or economy," Bush ordered then Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld to detain what were called "enemy aliens."81 Used in World War II
to encompass Japanese in the United States as well as enemies abroad, that
term had provided the basis on which a divided U.S. Supreme Court held in
1950 that Germans serving U.S. military sentences in Germany could not

Slow Rot at Supermax, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at Al. Noriega, meanwhile, is in custody at a
medium-security federal prison in Miami. Dick Foster, Supermax in Florence Likely to Be New
Home, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), May 4, 2006, at 29A. See Gerardo Reyes & Jay Weaver,
Noriega Set To Be Released, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 24, 2007, at Al (reporting that Noriega will
have served his U.S. sentence by the fall, after which he may face extradition, having already
been convicted in absentia-inPanama, of murder, and in France, of money laundering).
80 Warren Richey, How Long Can Guantanamo Prisoners Be Held?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Apr. 9, 2002, at 1 (quoting John Yoo, then Deputy Assistant Attorney General).
81 Presidential Order, supra note 1, §§ l(e), (g), 2(a)(ii). Five years later, Rumsfeld was replaced
by one-time CIA Director Robert M. Gates. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jim Rutenberg, Rumsfeld
Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at Al. On the use of the term in the immediate postSeptember 11 period, see generally David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (May 2002).
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petition U.S. courts for writs of habeas corpus.8 2 By presidential order postSeptember 11 detainees-many of whom eventually were held in a detention
camp at the U.S. naval base at Guant~namo Bay, Cuba-were to receive
humane and nondiscriminatory treatment, and "when tried, to be tried for
violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military
tribunals."8 3 The tribunals were to operate apart from the ordinary military
or civilian criminal justice system. They were supposed to afford defendants
"fair and equitable" trials, according to the order; nevertheless, adherence to
"the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized" in
federal criminal courts was deemed "not practicable."8 4 Vice President Dick
Cheney elaborated, saying of the detainees, "They don't deserve the same
guarantees and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen going
through the normal judicial process."85
An ensuing Defense Department regulation provided a nonexhaustive
list of crimes for which a military commission could try a person as a direct
participant or otherwise; for example, under the principle of command
responsibility.8 6 The list first enumerated "War Crimes" that resembled the
Statute of the International Criminal Court more than the UCMJ: willful
killing of protected persons, attacking civilians, pillaging, denying quarter,
taking hostages, employing poison or analogous weapons, using protected
persons or property as shields, torture, treachery or perfidy, improper use of
protective emblems, and rape.8 7 The list then addressed a second category,
including hijacking or "hazarding" a vessel or aircraft, terrorism, murder or
destruction of property by an "unprivileged belligerent," aiding the enemy,

82 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). On the history of the term see, for example, John
Joel Culley, Enemy Alien Control in the United States During World War II: A Survey, in ALIEN
JUSTICE: WARTIME INTERNMENT IN AUSTRALIA AND NORTH AMERICA 138 (Kay Saunders & Roger

Daniels eds., 2000); David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on
Terrorism,38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2003).
83 Presidential Order, supra note 1, § 1(e). On this and other post-September 11 camps, see

generally Diane Marie Amann, Abu Ghraib, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2085, 2085, 2090-95 (2005)
[hereinafter Amann, Abu Ghraib]; Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 263 (2004) [hereinafter Amann, Guantdnamo].
84Presidential Order, supra note 1, § 1(f).
5 Peter Slevin & George Lardner, Jr., Bush Plan for Terrorism Trials Defended, WASH. POST,
Nov. 15, 2001, at A28 (quoting Vice President Dick Cheney).
86DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTION NO. 2, CRIMES AND ELEMENTS

FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSION, §§ 3(A), (C), 6(C)(3)-(4) (2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/newsfMay2003/d2003O430milcominstno2.pdf [hereinafter MCI No. 2].
87

See id., § 6(A)(1)-(18). Cf. ICC Statute, supra note 37, at art. 8.
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spying, perjury or false testimony, and obstruction of justice.88 There was
disingenuity in the label given this category, "Other Offenses Triable by
Military Commission," since crimes like hijacking typically had been
prosecuted within the civilian system. Similarly, the regulations included
among the means by which a person could be held criminally liable "the
separate offense of conspiracy," notwithstanding that the crime of conspiracy
89
is unknown to the law of war as it is practiced outside the United States.
The Defense Department regulations bestowed upon what Bush called
"tribunals" a new appellation: "military commissions." By this renaming, the
government sought to link the post-September 11 initiative to an institution
which had been used occasionally ever since the 1846-48 Mexican-American
War and which had "received statutory recognition" from Congress during
America's Civil War. 90 Among the most notable military commissions were
two that took place during World War II. The first, established to try eight
German saboteurs found on U.S. soil, was reviewed by the Supreme Court in
its decision in Quirin.91 The second, established to prosecute a Japanese
general as the commander responsible for war crimes that his troops
committed during the battle for the Philippines, was reviewed in a judgment
that bears the general's name, Yamashita.92 U.S. military commissions
operated often pursuant to statute and on occasion pursuant to the common
law of war; even the latter type usually endeavored to follow court-martial
procedures as much as possible. 93 But the commissions that resulted from the

88 See MCI No. 2, supra note 86, § 6(B)(1)-(8).
Id., §§ 6(C), 6(C)(6). See Brief for Specialists in Conspiracy and International Law as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184), available
at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/briefs (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); Warren Richey, Is
Conspiracy a War Crime?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 2006, at 2. For a comprehensive
discussion of the risks associated with inserting the Anglo-American crime of conspiracy into
prosecutions for violations of international law, see Aaron Fichtelberg, Conspiracy and
InternationalCriminalJustice, 17 CRIM. L. F. 149 (2006).
59

- A. Wigfall Green, The Military Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832, 833 (1948). See generally
David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of Military Commissions, 46 VA. J. IN'L L.
5 (2005).
91Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
92In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
93 See Eugene R. Fidell, Dwight H. Sullivan & Detlev F. Vagts, Military Commission Law, ARMY

LAWYER 47 (Dec. 2005); Cf. Lieber Code, supra note 22, at art. 13 (requiring that military
commissions conform to "the common law of war"). The UCMJ itself pointed to a congressional
intent that military commissions should operate within-and not apart from-the system of
military justice. It gave military commissions jurisdiction concurrent with those of courts-martial
over "offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
commissions," Uniform Code Military Justice at art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2007). Furthermore, it
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President's November 13 order comported neither with the laws of war nor
with the rules of American courts-martial.
Although the Executive denied that its program transgressed the
common law of war, it forthrightly acknowledged that the military
commissions were not courts-martial. No court-martial is required, the
Executive contended, for the reason that the persons who risk trial by
military commission are not "prisoners of war," but rather are "enemy
94
combatants" to whom the Geneva Conventions' framework does not apply.
In accordance with this rationale, the Executive refrained from giving any
detainee the hearing by a "competent tribunal" that is mandated in the U.S.
military regulation implementing the Third Geneva Convention. 95 Persons
detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba and elsewhere
thus have been held pursuant to the order of the President. The Executive
has maintained further that the law of armed conflict allows it to choose to
hold these persons for the duration of what may be a never-ending "war on
96
terror."
Some noncitizen detainees at Guant6namo, as well as two Americans
detained in military brigs in the United States, petitioned the civilian courts
for habeas corpus relief from their incommunicado custody. As part of a
trilogy of decisions issued in 2004, a divided Supreme Court permitted
detention of one man designated an enemy combatant.9 7 But the Court
extended to military commissions as well as to courts-martial an explicit preference for
application of "the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in" federal,
civilian courts. Id. at art. 36(a).
94 All who fight on the other side are, of course, "enemy combatants"--even prisoners of war

protected by Geneva law. Those the U.S. government would single out for exceptional treatment
more properly are called "unlawful enemy combatants"; even as to them, the government's postSeptember 11 policy was by no means preordained by prior practice. See generally, e.g., George C.
Harris, Terrorism, War and Justice: The Concept of the Unlawful Enemy Combatant, 26 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 31 (2003); Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of
Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863 (2006). See infra note 132
and accompanying text (discussing the government's eventual adoption of the term "unlawful
enemy combatant").
95 See AR 190-8, supra note 41, § 1-6.

This policy is enunciated in George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Vice President et al.,
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Feb. 7, 2002, reprinted in THE TORTURE
PAPERS 134-35 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). Governmental memoranda
arguing in favor of the policy are reprinted in the same volume at 29-143. Predictably, the policy
appeared to have complicated matters even with respect to Guantdnamo detainees whom the
United States wanted to release. The Executive expressed concern that if some were returnednow that the United Staies has labeled them foreign terrorists-they would risk mistreatment at
the hands of their own country. See Tim Golden, U.S. Says It Fears Detainee Abuse in
Repatriation,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006, at § 1, p. 1.
96

97 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 432 U.S. 507, 516-22 (2004) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) (writing that
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rejected the Executive's argument on two key points, holding in Hamdi that
an American detained in the United States was entitled to a judicial hearing
at which, aided by counsel, he could contest the lawfulness of his detention, 98
and in Rasul that non-Americans detained at Guantinamo, and perhaps at
other overseas sites, were entitled to pursue actions against the government
in federal, civilian courts. 99
These judgments opened a path for litigation of the military commissions
plan. As a result of legal challenges to and executive delays in
implementation of that plan, more than five years after issuance of the
President's order, fewer than a dozen of the more than 700 detainees who
had passed through the camp at Guantdinamo stood charged with any crime,
and not one witness had been called to testify at a trial by military
commission.100
b)

Hamdan and Its Aftermath

Among those who sued to stop the military commissions was Salim
Ahmed Hamdan, alleged to have been the chauffeur for Al Qaeda leader
Osama bin Laden. His comprehensive challenge to the commissions' legality
led a federal district court to rule in 2004 that under the Third Geneva
the Authorization for Use of Military Force Resolution gave President necessary authority, "for
the duration of these hostilities," to detain "an individual who . . . was part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an
armed conflict against the United States there") (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 589
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing for broader presidential authority to detain). See Authorization
for Use of Military Force Resolution, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224) (2001) [hereinafter
AUMFI.
98 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
99 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). On the matter of the second American held in enemy
combatant custody, see infra text accompanying notes 269-88. As of this writing one person, a
Qatari named Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, is still being held without charge in the United States
as an enemy combatant. See Adam Liptak, In a War with Vague Boundaries,A Terror Detainee
Longs for Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at Al. The 2004 detention trilogy is discussed more
fully in Amann, Abu Ghraib, supra note 83, at 2096-98.

100See Paul Garwood, IDs from GuantanamoRaise Nations' Outcry, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 21,
2006, at A9 (reporting that "490 detainees from about 40 countries" remained at the camp); Tim
Golden, Boycott Threat Roils Guantanamo Hearing,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2006, at A14 (stating
that the government had tried unsuccessfully to press forward with trials of nine detainees
charged even while waiting for the Supreme Court's decision in the case of the tenth detainee,
Salim Ahmed Hamdan) [hereinafter Golden, Boycott]. In spring 2007, one detainee's case was
resolved by means of a plea bargain that provoked controversy. See GuantdnamoFollies, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2007, at A20; Josh White, Australian'sPlea Deal Was Negotiated Without
Prosecutors,WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2007, at A7.
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Convention Hamdan was to be treated as a prisoner of war, entitled to a
court-martial, since there had never been a proper hearing on his prisoner of
war status.10 1 In the view of this court, the military commissions were not
equivalent to courts-martial. For this reason alone, trial by military
commission of detainees in Hamdan's position was ruled illegal. The district
court additionally invalidated the regulation that would have allowed the
commission to consider evidence adduced outside the presence of the
accused.1 0 2 One year later, however, the federal appellate court reversed. It
held inter alia that no aspect of the Third Geneva Convention applied to
"enemy combatants" like Hamdan and that, in any event, the Convention
10 3
was not justiciable in civilian courts.
The Supreme Court overturned that decision on June 29, 2006, holding
by a vote of five to three that the commissions contravened both U.S. law and
the international law it incorporated. 0 4 "Recognizing . . . that trial by
military commission is an extraordinary measure raising important
questions about the balance of powers in our constitutional structure,"
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the commission established by the
and procedures
President "lacks power to proceed because its structure
'10 5
Conventions."
Geneva
the
and
UCMJ
the
violate both
The Court held as a threshold matter that Congress intended that a
unique review procedure set out in its first legislative foray into the
detention issue-the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005-would apply only to
actions that might be filed after the Act took effect on December 30 of that

101 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004). A "Combatant Status Review

Tribunal" devised in the wake of the 2004 trilogy had classified the petitioner an "enemy
combatant," but the district court ruled that this proceeding was not equivalent to the prisoner of
war status hearing that the Third Geneva Convention and Army Regulation 190-8 require. Id. at
162.
102

Id. at 162, 168-70.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005); see
Diane Marie Amann, Le TransnationalismeFace & la Transition, REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE
ET DE DROIT PENAL COMPAREE 967 (no. 4-Oct./Dec. 2005) (discussing this judgment).
103

104 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). In the majority were Justices John Paul
Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer;
dissenting were Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Chief Justice John
Roberts, Jr. recused himself because he had taken part in the appellate decision before ascending
to the Supreme Court. See infra text accompanying note 145.
105 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2759. Stevens, also the author of the Court's 2004 decision in Rasul
which had given Guantdnamo detainees like Hamdan access to U.S. courts, had grappled with
this balance of powers decades earlier as a law clerk to Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr. See Diane
Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens, Human Rights Judge, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1569 (2006); David
G. Savage, High Court's 1945 War Crimes Ruling Resounds, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, at A23.

Spring 2007]

PUNISH OR SURVEIL

year. 10 6 Actions that hundreds of detainees had filed before that date were
Court ruled that
subject to ordinary federal litigation rules; accordingly, the
10 7
case.
Hamdan's
of
merits
the
address
to
jurisdiction
it had
Whether the Executive had the power to detain Hamdan "for the
duration of active hostilities in order to prevent" harm was not raised by
petitioner, and the Court chose not to address that question, 10 8 but rather to
focus on the military commissions. A review of U.S. history demonstrated
that before September 11, such commissions had been the products of
"military necessity"; indeed, each jurisdictional aspect of such tribunals was
"supported by a separate military exigency."'1 9 Even in the face of necessity,
the Court continued, the government must exercise its powers within the
constraints of the Constitution and other U.S. law. 110 Of particular relevance
was Article 21 of the UCMJ, by which courts-martial and military
commissions had concurrent jurisdiction over "offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be tried by such military commissions ...
The Court held that no statute authorized the post-September 11
."1
commissions; accordingly, it proceeded to consider whether those
commissions were "justified under the 'Constitution and laws,' including the
12
law of war."'
A plurality of the Court concluded that the military commissions were
illegal for the reason that the sole offense with which Hamdan was chargedconspiracy-was not recognized by the law of war.11 3 The plurality noted as
well that none "of the overt acts that Hamdan is alleged to have committed
violates the law of war."" 4 No definitive ruling issued, however, because
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who cast the fifth vote in favor of much of the

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762-69 (interpreting § 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Detainee Treatment Act]).
106

at 2769. The Court further declined the government's request that it abstain from hearing
107 Id.
Hamdan's legal challenge until the conclusion of his trial by military commission. Id. at 2769-72.
108Id.

at 2798.

109Id.

at 2773.

110Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2773-74.
111
Id. at 2774 (quoting the Uniform Code of Military Justice § 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2007)).
112Id. at 2775 (quoting Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(3)).
113Id. at 2775-86 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
114

Id. at 2778 (plurality opinion).
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judgment, declined to reach this question.1 1 5
The five-member majority did agree that "[tihe UCMJ conditions the
President's use of military commissions on compliance not only with the
American common law of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ itself,
insofar as applicable, and with the 'rules and precepts of the law of nations,'
including, inter alia, the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949."116 The
Court assumed arguendo that a habeas petitioner like Hamdan could not
invoke a provision of the Convention "as an independent source of law
binding the Government's actions and furnishing petitioner with any
enforceable right";117 however, the UCMJ requirement that commissions
adhere to "the law of war" effectively incorporated the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions. 118
Recognition of the Conventions had led the district court to conclude that
until Hamdan's detainee status is determined in accordance with Article 5 of
the Third Geneva Convention, he must be treated as a prisoner of war, and
thus he could be tried only before an ordinary court-martial. 119 The Supreme
Court did not reach the Article 5 question.1 20 Instead, it held that the
underlying conflict was, at the least, a "conflict not of an international
character," in which state parties such as the United States were forbidden to

115Hamdan,

126 S. Ct. at 2809 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (declining to reach issue).

Id. at 2786 (opinion of the Court) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) and citing In
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1946)).
16

Id. at 2794. Though it declined to rule on the question, the Court suggested some
disagreement with this assumption by its insertion at this juncture of two footnotes. The first
note described the purpose of the 1949 Conventions, in contrast with predecessor treaties, as
"first and foremost to protect individuals, and not to serve state interests." Id. at 2794 n.57
(quoting 4 INT'L COMM. FOR THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 21 (1958)). The second footnote quoted a
passage stating that "[i]t
should be possible in States which are parties to the Convention ...for
the rules of the Convention to be evoked before an appropriate national court by the protected
person who has suffered a violation .... Id. at 2794 n.58 (quoting 1 INT'L COMM. FOR THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE
117

WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 84 (1952)).
118 Id. at 2794. ("For, regardless of the nature of the rights conferred on Hamdan, they are, as the

Government does not dispute, part of the law of war. And compliance with the law of war is the
condition upon which the authority set forth in Article 21 is granted.") (citations omitted).
119 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (D.D.C. 2004).

Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2795 n.61. Cf. Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review
Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667 (2006) (arguing that the
tribunals, established in the wake of the Court's 2004 detention trilogy, do not satisfy Article 5).
120
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violate Article 3 common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions. 121 Although it
allowed that the article's description of minimum standards "tolerates a
great degree of flexibility," the Court underscored: "requirements they are
22
nonetheless."1
Key to the case was Common Article 3's ban on "the passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by
a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized by civilized peoples." 123 Consulting the French treaty text as well
as the Commentary published by the International Committee for the Red
Cross, the Court construed Common Article 3 to bar trial by "special
tribunals" and to mandate trial by courts "established and organized in
accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a country."124 In
the United States, the Court held such courts "are the courts-martial
established by congressional statutes," and no "deviations from court-martial
practice" are permitted absent demonstration of a "practical need" to depart,
125
a need that the Executive had failed to demonstrate.
This reasoning was extended to procedures. Commission regulations
failed to satisfy the UCMJ's statutory preference that military commission
procedures conform as far as practicable with those of the ordinary civilian
and military courts, the Court held, and a plurality reached the same
conclusion upon assessing procedures against the requirements of Common
Article 3.126 In point of fact, the plurality maintained that the regulations
violated the fair trial requirements of customary international law, many of
which it found described in, inter alia, the first protocol to the 1949 Geneva
27
Conventions and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1

121Hamdan,

126 S. Ct. at 2795-96 (quoting Third Geneva Convention, art. 3).

122Id.

at 2798 (emphasis in original).

123Id.

at 2795-96 (quoting Third Geneva Convention, art. 3).

124Id.

at 2796-97, n.64 (quoting 4 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 355 (2005) and the French version of the Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 32, at art. 66).
125 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006) (quoting id. at 2803-04 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part)).
126Id. at 2786 (opinion for the Court); see id. at 2797-98 (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J., joined by
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
127Id. at 2797-98 (plurality opinion) (citing Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 75,
(June 8, 1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, at art. 14, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]). The United States is a party to the second but not the first of these
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The five-member majority singled out as violative of all these sources of law
the "wholesale" exclusion of the accused from trial proceedings against himan exclusion to which Hamdan already had been subjected. 128
The judgment in Hamdan set off a flurry of activity both in the executive
branch and in Congress, the national legislature that had scarcely attended
to detainee matters in the more than four years since September 11. Some,
including some members of Congress, interpreted the decision to require
detainees be tried by courts-martial or in UCMJ-sanctioned proceedings
virtually the same as courts-martial.1 29 But supporters of the military
commissions pointed to a separate opinion-in which Justice Stephen Breyer
wrote that "[n]othing prevents the President from returning to Congress to
seek the authority he believes necessary"13 0 -and to sundry other passages in
Hamdan in order to argue that the initial plan could be rendered legal by
having Congress adopt it, with few changes, in a statute.' 3 ' To a great extent
Congress acceded to that argument, establishing, in the Military
Commissions Act signed into law on October 17, 2006, post-Hamdan
commissions much like the pre-Hamdan version. In some instances, in fact,
the new Act exceeded the prior plan. The President's 2001 order applied only
to noncitizens, for example. In contrast, the Act's definition of "enemy
combatants," "lawful" and "unlawful," encompassed noncitizens and citizens
132
alike, although only the latter would be subject to military commissions.
treaties; however, the United States had accepted that protocol procedures constitute customary
international law. William H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict after 9/11: Some Salient
Features, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 319, 321-22 (2003) (author then-Legal Adviser to the State
Department); see also Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions,
Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407,
1426-27, 1427 n.99 (2002).
128 See

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786-93 (opinion for the Court); id. at 2797-98 (plurality opinion).

129 See Military Commissions to Try Enemy Combatants, Before the Subcomm. on Emerging
Threats and Capabilities, S. Comm. on Armed Services (testimony of Eugene R. Fidell, President,
National Institute of Military Justice) July 19, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 12425203;
Jonathan Weisman, Senators Gain Momentum to Change Military Tribunal System, WASH. POST,
July 15, 2006, at A6; Signs of Life in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2006, § 4, at 11; Kate Zernike,
A Top Senate Republican Is Uncertain on Legislation for Military Tribunals for Terror Suspects,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2006, at A10.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., concurring).
130

131 Id.
Congress went so far as to inquire whether, as a matter of U.S. law, it could enact
legislation in violation of Geneva law. Adam Liptak, Scholars Agree That Congress Could Reject
Conventions, But Not That It Should, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A9.
132 Compare Presidential Order, supra note 1, § 2(a), at 57834 (defining 'individual subject to
this order" to mean "any individual who is not a United States citizen"), with 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a
(1), (2), 948b(a), 948c, 948d(a) (defining the two types of "enemy combatants" without reference to
citizenship, and providing that military commissions will try "alien unlawful enemy
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The Supreme Court's holding in Hamdan that Common Article 3
constituted a global constraint on state action raised the prospect that U.S.
officials responsible for the mistreatment of detainees might be prosecuted
under the War Crimes Act,133 by which Congress in 1996 had made violations
of Common Article 3 federal offenses punishable by imprisonment or
135
death. 34 A number of Senators expressed dismay at this possibility.
Notwithstanding an official pronouncement that Pentagon regulations
unrelated to military commissions "comply with the standards of Common
Article 3,"136 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, among others, maintained
that Common Article 3 was unfairly vague. 37 The White House push to
shrink the scope of crimes punishable within the rubric of Common Article 3
succeeded. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 amended the War Crimes
Act of 1996, which had proscribed all "violations," so that it would authorize
criminal punishment only for "grave breaches." 138 Definitions of offenses
further circumscribed the reach of U.S. criminal law: to cite but one example,
the definitions of "rape" and "sexual assault" or "abuse" appeared to exclude
numerous incidents of sexual humiliation reported to have occurred at
Guantdnamo and other U.S. detention centers. 139 The 2006 Act declared that

combatants"). Irrefutable determination of whether a captive was "lawful" or "unlawful" was left
to Combatant Status Review Tribunals notwithstanding lingering questions about that post-2004
innovation. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(1)(ii), 948d(c). A few months after Congress passed the 2006 Act,
the Department of Defense issued regulations that elaborated on the Act's provisions. THE
MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, Jan. 18, 2007, available at http://www.defenselink.mil
/news/d20070118MCM.pdf.
133See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text (discussing War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441
(1996)).
134 Id.

135See Pete Yost, Assoc. Press, Curb Gitmo Ruling, 2 GOP Senators Say, S.F. CHRON., July 1,
2006, at A3.
136Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales at the Justice Dept. Oversight
Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. NEWSWIRE, July 18, 2006,
http://releases.usnewswire.com/GetRelease.asp?id=69358.

137Cf. Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Secretaries of the
Military Departments et al., Application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the
Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense (July 7, 2006), available at
http:/lwww.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationlnationalsecuritylgenevaconvdoc.pdf
(last visited
Feb. 1, 2007).
13818 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1) (listing as crimes torture, cruel or inhuman treatment, performing
biological experiments, murder, mutilation or maiming, rape, intentionally causing serious bodily
injury, rape, sexual assault or abuse, taking hostages); 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)(1) (declaring that this
proscription encompasses all "grave breaches" of Common Article 3).
139 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(G), (H), (d)(2)(C) (defining "rape" as involving, at the least, attempted
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by enumerating certain crimes, the United States had "fully satisf[ied]" its
duty "to provide effective penal sanctions for grave breaches which are
encompassed in common Article 3" 140-even as it acknowledged that the
United States' overall obligation under that article extended to other
misconduct. 14 1 Amendments to the War Crimes Act were made retroactive,
moreover, a move that worked to insulate from federal criminal prosecution
142
all who played a role in post-September 11 abuses.
B. FairnessConstraintson Punishment
To describe the competence of civilian and military jurisdictions is to tell
but part of the story of the punishment regime. Equally important is the
quality of those jurisdictions; that is, the degree to which each adhered to
guarantees of fairness that are fundamental to American and, increasingly,
to international standards of justice. These include guarantees respecting
independence and impartiality and the rights of the accused.
1. Independence and Impartiality
"Independence" and "impartiality" are related but have separate
meanings. "Independence" points to questions of institutional design; that is,
penetration of victim, and "sexual assault or abuse" as entailing "sexual contact"); Editorial,
Rushing Off a Cliff, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2006, at A22 (stating that the Military Commissions
Act defines "[r]ape and sexual assault ... in a retrograde way that covers only forced or coerced
activity, and not other forms of nonconsensual sex."). On abuses alleged to have occurred, see, for
example, Amann, Abu Ghraib, supra note 83, at 2091, 2099-2104; Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt,
Inquiry Finds Abuses at Guantanamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2005, § 1, at 35 (reporting on
study by Physicians for Human Rights that confirmed "the veracity of news media accounts of
female interrogators flaunting their sexuality to humiliate devout Muslims, including smearing
red fluid said to be menstrual blood on prisoners."). For criticism of other aspects of this
amendment, see Ida L. Bostian, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 217, 230-34 (2006).
140

18 U.S.C. § 2441(a)(2).

See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(5) (defining "grave breaches" as those of Common Article 3, "not the
full scope of United States obligations"). The Act does include a prohibition on "cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment," but provides that the term must be interpreted no more
broadly than similar terms in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, and in any event it does not
specify any sanctions for violation, but leaves the matter of compliance with the ban in the hands
of the President. 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-0(3) (2006).
141

18 U.S.C. § 2441(b)(2) (stating that amendments "shall take effect as of November 26, 1997, as
if enacted immediately after" the much earlier amendments to the War Crimes Act). Even before
enactment, the International Committee of the Red Cross expressed its "concern" with this
retroactivity provision. R. Jeffrey Smith, War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce Threat of
Prosecution, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2006, at Al. The amendments do not eliminate, for persons
subject to the UCMJ, the risk of prosecution by court-martial, nor, for anyone over whom a
tribunal might obtain jurisdiction, the risk of prosecution in an international forum or in the
criminal courts of another country.
142
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to "structural independence" or to "freedom from interference" by, in
particular, other governmental entities. 143 Canada's Supreme Court has
described independence as "a status or relationship to others, particularly to
the executive branch of government that rests on objective conditions or
guarantees."' 14 4 To that end, independence is first concerned with matters of
financial and job security. Judges are guaranteed to serve long tenures and
may not be removed except upon proof that they have engaged in specified
misconduct. 145 No judge should fear that the rendering of an unpopular
1 46
decision will provoke a reduction in either salary or resources.
A second factor relating to independence is-as stated in Basic Principles
adopted at a U.N. meeting in 1985-the obligation of "the judiciary to ensure
that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rights of the
parties are respected." 147 To fulfill this requirement, the judge should have a
solid understanding of the law, as well as experience with the task of
adjudication. Accordingly, a third factor contributing to judicial independence
is the adoption of a method for choosing the best person from among those
148
candidates who possess the requisite qualifications.
"Impartiality," in contrast, is a subjective concept. Again quoting the
Canadian Supreme Court, it is "a state of mind or attitudes of the tribunal in
relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case."1 49 An impartial

143International Protection of the Independence of the Judicial Process, 76 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.

PROC. 307, 330 (1982).
144 Valente

v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 685.

145 See

Principle No. 11, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 7th U.N. Congress
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, Aug. 26-Sept. 6, 1985, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 at 59 (1985), availableat http://wwwl.umn.edu/huma
nrts/instree/i5bpij.htm [hereinafter Basic Principles].
146

Id. at Principle No. 12.

147

Id. at Principle No. 6.

Id. at pmbl., para. 9; see also id. at Principle No. 10 (calling for attention to "selection" and
"training," and requiring that "[a]ny method of judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial
appointments for improper motives").
148

Valente, 2 S.C.R. at 685. Among those discussing the interrelation of impartiality and
independence was U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter. Objecting to a majority ruling
that government employees would not ipso facto be biased jurors in a prosecution for willful
failure to appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee, he wrote:
149

The reason for disqualifying a whole class on the ground of bias is the law's
recognition that if the circumstances of that class in the run of instances are
likely to generate bias, consciously or unconsciously, it would be a hopeless
endeavor to search out the impact of these circumstances on the mind and
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judge acts without bias-without having decided which side to favor before
both sides have presented their evidence in court. In so doing, the judge
complies with a primary injunction of the U.N. Basic Principles: "The
judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts
and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper
influences, inducements, pressures, threats, or interferences, direct or
150
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason."
The courts of the United States traditionally have been both independent
and impartial. Imagine an inverted pyramid: civilian courts would rest at the
top, with courts-martial below. At the bottom would languish the military
commissions. Both as proposed by President Bush after September 11 and as
established by Congress after the decision in Hamdan, the commissions
151
provoked serious questions respecting independence and impartiality.
a)

Civilian Courts

The Constitution was framed with an eye to promoting judicial
independence. In keeping with the principle of separation of powers, Article
II empowers the President to nominate federal judges; nominees may not
take office, however, unless confirmed by the Senate. 152 The confirmation
process often is lengthy, and often nongovernmental organizations such as
the American Bar Association offer their views on whether the nominee is
qualified. Once confirmed, a judge operates within the framework of Article
III, which provides: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished

judgment of a particular individual .... The appearance of impartiality is an
essential manifestation of its reality. This is the basic psychological reason
why the Founders of this country gave the judiciary an unlimited tenure.
Impartiality requires independence, and independence, the Framers realized,
requires freedom from the effect of those "occasional ill-humors in the
society," which as Alexander Hamilton put it in The Federalist are "the
influence of particular conjunctures."
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 181-82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, (Alexander Hamilton), 400 (Max Beloff ed., 1948)).
150 Basic Principles, supra note 145, at Principle No. 2.
For a comparative evaluation in tabular format of how each of the fora under review in this
Report treat impartiality and independence as well as procedural guarantees, see CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS, SIZING UP THE BUSH MILITARY COMMISSIONS: COMPARISON OF MODELS OF
DUE PROCESS, http://www.americanprogress.org/atf/cf/{E9245FE4-9A2b-43C7-A521-5D6FF2E06
E03}/milcommissions.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
151

152U.S. CONST. art. II,

§ 2.
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during their Continuance in Office."'15 3 The passage guarantees a baseline
salary level and tenure for life absent serious misconduct. As the
Constitution's earliest supporters recognized, both promote an independent
1 54
judiciary.
The federal judiciary is charged with checking against abuse of
governmental power. The Constitution expressly provides for habeas corpus,
the writ by which the courts may order the release of someone whom the
government is detaining in contravention of the law. 155 The Due Process
Clause of the Constitution further forbids any deprivation by the state "of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."'1 6 In enforcing this
protection, the Supreme Court has held that the clause includes not only a
guarantee that state action adhere to certain procedures, but also that it
meet the substantive standard of fundamental fairness. 157 Independence and
impartiality partake of both procedure and substance, and it is well
established in U.S. criminal jurisprudence that proceedings against a person
158
can be judged only by an independent and impartial decision maker.
Although the federal courts incorporate many attributes that constitute
impartiality and independence, threats persist. Prompting recent threats
were the Supreme Court judgments that outlawed both the juvenile death
penalty and the criminal prosecution of same-sex sodomy. 159 Opponents have
called for an end to life tenure, for impeachment of judges, and for exploring
ways to cut judicial budgets. 60 Congress contributed by passing jurisdiction-

153

Id. at art. III, § 1.

See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (1st Mod. Library ed., 1941)
(arguing that "nothing will contribute" as much as "the permanent tenure of judicial offices" to
promoting "that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance" of their duty to protect against governmental abuse).
154

155

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see supra text accompanying note 19.

156U.S. CONST. amend. V. See id. amend. XIV (extending same obligation to the constituent
states of the Union). Providing a further check at trial is the federal petit jury of twelve
laypersons who must agree unanimously before a verdict issues. See U.S. CONST. art. LII.

157See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954).
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450-53 (1971); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 269-73
(1948).
158

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 629 (2005) (death penalty); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
579 (2003) (gay rights).
159

160See Tom Curry, House Members Protest Use of Non-U.S. Rulings in Big Cases, MSNBC.cOM,
Mar. 11, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232 (impeachment); Linda Greenhouse, How Long Is
Too Long For the Court's Justices?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, § 4, at 5 (life tenure); Peter
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stripping laws that proclaimed the courts incompetent to hear certain
matters. 161
The duty of impartiality is reflected in codes of ethical conduct like that
promulgated by the American Bar Association. 162 Judges, moreover, may
recuse themselves at any time. They need not give any reason for doing so,
although often their reason may be inferred from the circumstances. The
availability of recusal played a role in Hamdan, in which the Supreme Court
assessed the legality of military commissions that the President had
established after September 11, 2001.163 Justice Antonin Scalia had turned
aside requests that he recuse himself on account of his public declaration,
weeks before oral argument in the case, that it was "crazy" to think that
Guantinamo detainees deserved a "full jury trial."'164 However, Chief Justice
John G. Roberts, Jr., who before his elevation had been a member of the
appellate panel that judged Hamdan, decided not to take part in the case
65
once it arrived at the Supreme Court.1
b)

Courts-Martial

Military justice, like its civilian counterpart, is supposed to proceed in a
Wallsten, 2 Evangelicals Want to Strip Courts' Funds, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2005, at A22
(budgets).
161 E.g., Travis Christopher Barham, Note, Congress Gave and Congress Hath Taken Away:
Jurisdiction Withdrawal and the Constitution, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1143-47 (2005)
(describing such legislation on matters such as same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance);
Theodore J. Weiman, Comment, Jurisdiction Stripping, Constitutional Supremacy, and the
Implications of Ex Parte Young, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1677, 1677 (2005).
162 MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html.

(1990)

(amended

2004),

available

at

163See supra text accompanying notes 97-124.
164 Charles Lane, Scalia's Recusal Sought in Key Detainee Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2006, at
A6 (quoting remarks Scalia made at the University of Freiburg, and noting that, although in
2004 Scalia had recused himself after making comments about a pending free speech case, in
2005 he took part in a case brought against Vice President Cheney, notwithstanding revelations
that the two recently had gone duck hunting together). Scalia's statement was curious given that
the court-martial-the forum that the district court in Hamdan ruled required by applicable
law-does not entail a "full jury trial."

See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) grantingcert. to review Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Roberts replaced the late Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who
had dissented from the June 2004 judgments that extended some rights to post-September 11
detainees. See Adam Cohen, Anthony Kennedy Is Ready for His Close-up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2006, at A16. Also new to the Court was Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. Id. Whereas his predecessor,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, joined the majority in Rasul and wrote the plurality opinion in
Hamdi, Alito joined two other dissenting Justices to vote in favor of the government in Hamdan.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 622.
165
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fair and impartial manner. 166 Courts-martial are organized not under Article
III, but rather pursuant to Congress' power to legislate military affairs. 167
Article I judges are guaranteed neither life tenure nor protection against
reduction in salary. A panel of the general court-martial, before which the
most serious offenses are to be adjudicated, must comprise a military judge
and no fewer than five members. 168 The military judge must be a
commissioned officer who is a member of the bar and certified as qualified for
such service. 169 Outside of the Army and the C6ast Guard, military judges do
not have an established term, but rather serve when so appointed by the
Judge Advocate General of the branch to which they belong. 170 The transitory
nature of this service may endanger impartiality and independence, as
contended in an article by the president of the National Institute of Military
Justice:
Military trial judges . . . are not senatorially-confirmed as
judges. They preside over courts that appear without warning
and vanish without a trace, in contrast to the district courts,
some of which have been in continuous operation for over two
hundred years. Unlike their civilian counterparts, military
judges are selected by the Judge Advocates General and are
subject to evaluation like other commissioned officers. They
enjoy no protected term of office, and are therefore subject to
removal at will, subject only to the Court of Appeals' (in my
view) illusory and inadequate promise. . .that they would
somehow be protected from retaliatory removal. Military
171
judicial discipline remains a secret.

166 See Maj. Gen. William A. Moorman, Fifty Years of Military Justice: Does the Uniform Code of
Military Justice Need to Be Changed?, 48 A.F. L. REV. 185, 188 (2000) (stating, in remarks by the
Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, that "promoting justice in individual cases" by means
such as "due process, fairness, and impartiality" is a core purpose of military justice).
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

168 Uniform Code of Military Justice §§ 16, 18, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816, 818 (2001).
169 Id. § 26, 10 U.S.C. §826.
170 See Eugene R. Fidell, A World-Wide Perspective on Change in Military Justice, 48 A.F. L. REV.
195, 203 & n.43 (2000) (discussing the significance of the Army's fixing of military judges' terms)
[hereinafter Fidell, Perspective]. Noting that military judges are appointed pursuant to Congress'
Article I powers rather than pursuant to the judicial power set forth in Article III of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court recently held, in a noncapital case, that a defendant's right to
due process was not violated by a trial before a military judge who does not enjoy a fixed term of
office. Weiss v. Hernandez, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994).
171Eugene R. Fidell, Going on Fifty: Evolution and Devolution in Military Justice, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1213, 1226-27 (1997) (footnotes omitted). Information about the National
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As for the members who sit in judgment at courts-martial, the UCMJ
states that whenever possible they shall not be junior in rank or grade to the
person on trial.172 On conclusion of evidence, they are to vote by secret ballot
173
Most
on whether to convict the accused and on what sentence to levy.
sentences require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members, but a
vote of three-quarters is required for a sentence of more than ten years in
174
prison, and a sentence of death requires a unanimous vote.
A person convicted by general court-martial may seek further recourse
via a multi-tiered system of review. 75 At the first tier are the appellate
courts established in each of the service branches, the members of which may
include civilians as well as military officers. 176 Like the military judge at the
trial level, they are assigned by a Judge Advocate General. 177 At the second
tier of review is the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Judges of this
court comprise civilians who have not been on active military duty for at
least twenty years and who are nominated by the President subject to the
advice and consent of the Senate. 178 Their terms are lengthy, in order to
promote independence. 179 Since 1983 the decisions of the military courts have
been subject to certiorari review by the Supreme Court. 8 0 Matters that the
Supreme Court has considered since then include the admissibility of certain

Institute of Military Justice, a nongovernmental organization, may be found at National
Institute of Military Justice, http://www.nimj.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
172

10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(1) (2006).

173 10 U.S.C. § 851.
174 10 U.S.C. §§ 851, 852 (2006).
175 See Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 141 (1953) ("The revised Articles...

also establish a
hierarchy within the military establishment to review the convictions of courts-martial, to ferret
out irregularities in the trial, and to enforce.. .procedural safeguards.")
176 See 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2006).
177

Id.

178 See Robinson 0.

Everett, The First 50 Years of the Uniform Code of Military Justice: A
PersonalPerspective, 47 FED. LAWYER 28 (Nov./Dec. 2000) (noting that at times Article III judges
have sat on this court); Fidell, Perspective,supra note 170, at 206.
179 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1988), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1989).

'so Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98-209, § 10, 97 Stat. 1393 (1983), codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1259 (2006). For a general discussion of the structure of the U.S. military justice system, see
Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty: The Cox Commission
Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. DETROIT COLL. L. 57, 71-82.
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181
evidence and the availability of the death penalty in courts-martial.

With regard to "enemy prisoners of war" tried by court-martial, the
pertinent military regulation, AR 190-8, expressly guarantees that any
sentence resulting from conviction by a court-martial may be appealed and
82
also requires that even if appeal is waived, the sentence must be reviewed.1
The regulation effectively tracks the established court-martial process, in
keeping with the Third Geneva Convention, which grants detained prisoners
of war a "right of appeal or petition from any sentence," to be accorded "in the
18 3
same manner as the members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power."'
c)

Military Commissions

There are differences between the civilian and the military courts. The
situation of military judges, in particular, creates a risk of dependence or
partiality; however, the involvement of civilian appeals judges and the
availability of ultimate review by the highest civilian court are designed to
diminish that risk. In the post-September 11 military commissions, by
contrast, these risks remain robust.
(1) Pre-Hamdan
To the extent that the President's military commissions were grounded in
a statutory authorization-whether the UCMJ or a joint resolution that
Congress passed one week after September 11S 4 --they ought to have
respected the principles of impartiality and independence at least as well as
the rest of the United States' military justice system. To the extent that those
commissions were the product of the common law of war, they ought to have
satisfied international norms. Among such norms is the requirement, set
forth in Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, of "a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized

181 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (affirming a sentence of death that a general
court-martial imposed after convicting an Army private of two murders); United States v.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (holding that the military's per se rule against admitting polygraph
evidence did not violate the constitutional right of the accused to present a defense).
182 AR

190-8, supra note 41, § 3-8(h).

183 Third

Geneva Convention, supra note 32, at art. 106.

184 The President's Nov. 13, 2001, order cited as authorities two articles of the UCMJ and the
AUMF, supra note 97. Presidential Order, supra note 1. The Executive also has contended that
the Detainee Treatment Act, supra note 106, passed in December 2005, constituted sufficient
congressional authorization for the military commissions. Brief of the United States, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, No. 05-184 (U.S.), at 15, available at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com]Hamdan
SGmeritsbrief.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. Hamdan Briefl. But the Supreme
Court rejected this argument. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774-75 (2006).
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as indispensable by civilized peoples." 18 5 Convention protocols-one of which
a plurality of the Court in Hamdan judged to be enforceable as customary
international law-make clear that these guarantees include independence
and impartiality. 8 6 The Executive's post-September 11 military commissions
fell short of minimum internal and international standards.
Each military commission was composed of three to seven military
officers chosen by an Appointing Authority named by the Secretary of
Defense, himself an appointee of the President. 8 7 This Presiding Officer had
the power to dismiss a commissioner for "good cause," a decision to be made
"in accordance with the standards established by the Appointing
Authority."'88 He was further empowered to choose a Presiding Officer for
each commission, as well as the Chief Prosecutor and Chief Defense Counsel;
the first of these was to be an officer of the military's judge advocate corps,
while the latter two also could be attorneys from the U.S. Department of
Justice.189
As is the case in courts-martial, a defendant could have been convicted if
two-thirds of the commissioners were convinced beyond reasonable doubt of
the defendant's guilt, while a unanimous vote of at least seven members was
required for a death sentence. Life sentences could have been imposed upon a

185 Third

Geneva Convention, supra note 32, at art. 3.

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2797-98 (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.)
(deeming Additional Protocol I, art. 75, as descriptive of customary international norms
respecting fair-trial procedures). See Additional Protocol I, supra note 123, at art. 75(4) (stating
that "[n]o sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person found guilty of a
penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an
impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of
regular judicial procedure") (emphasis added); Additional Protocol II, supra note 72, at art. 6(2)
("No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed on a person found guilty of an
offense except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of
independence and impartiality.") (emphasis added); see supra notes 63, 115 (stating that the
United States is a signatory but not a state party to these protocols).
186

187Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, Procedures for Trials by Military
Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, Aug. 31,
2005, §§ 2, 3(A), 4(A)(1)-(3), http://www.defenselink.mil/newsISep2005/d2OO50902order.pdf
[hereinafter MCO No. 1].
188 Department of Defense Military Commission Instruction No. 8, Administrative Procedures,
Sept. 16, 2005, § 3(A), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissionsinst
ructions.html (visited May 16, 2006).
189See MCO No. 1, supra note 187, § 4(A)(4)-(5), (B), (C). See generally Department of Defense
Military Commission Instruction No. 3, Responsibilities of the Chief Prosecutor, Deputy Chief
Prosecutor, Prosecutors, and Assistant Prosecutors, July 15, 2005, and Department of Defense
Military Commission Instruction No. 4, Responsibilities of the Chief Defense Counsel, Deputy
Chief Defense Counsel, Detailed Defense Counsel, and Civilian Defense Counsel, Sept. 16, 2005,
both available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissionsinstructions.
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vote of two-thirds, a margin that was less than the three-quarters needed in
courts-martial for any sentence of more than ten years in prison. 190
It was in the review of conviction and sentence that the commissions
departed radically from the established system of military justice. In lieu of
the multi-layered review system now in place for courts-martial, all review of
commission verdicts were to remain within the executive branch. 19 1
Defendants were forbidden from seeking recourse in any domestic, foreign, or
international forum. 92 And anyone whom a commission might have
acquitted could have remained subject to indefinite internment at
Guantinamo.193
The military commissions were proclaimed by the President as he
exercised his constitutional duties as Commander in Chief to launch an
armed counterassault against terrorists. That struggle continues to this day;
indeed, the Executive has taken to calling it "the long war."'194 The same
President is responsible for the designation of detainees as "enemy
combatants." Executive appointees-commissioners whom the Executive had
-wide discretion to dismiss-were to act as judge and jury. Other appointees
then were to review each case before turning it over to the President, who
would have made the final decision without recourse to the Supreme Court or
any other civilian judicial forum. The same military from which commission
officials were drawn then would have acted as custodian and, potentially, as
executioner. Clearly, the absence of structural independence and the
presence of a risk that commissioners would favor the government were

190MCO No. 1, supra note 187, § 6(F), (G); Presidential Order, supra note 1, § 4(a), (c)(6)-(7), at
57834-57835.
191 See MCO No. 1, supra note 187, § 6(H) (describing stages of review process, beginning with
panel of three military officers and ending with President's final decision); Presidential Order,
supra note 1, §§ 4(c)(8), 7(a)(2), at 57835 (describing review and retaining pardon power).

192See Presidential Order, supra note 1, § 7(b)(2), at 57835-36 (declaring that an "individual shall
not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to
have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the
United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international
tribunal"); see also MCO No. 1, supra note 187, § 10 (prohibiting an interpretation that the
order's provisions implicate the Constitution).
193Katharine Q. Seelye, A Nation Challenged: The Trials;Pentagon Says Acquittals May Not Free
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2002, at A13. Conversely, sentenced defendants would have
received no credit for time served during "[dietention associated with an individual's status as an
enemy combatant." Department of Defense Military Commission Instruction No. 7, Sentencing, §
2003,
available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/newsAug2004/comm
3(A),
Apr.
30,
issionsinstructions.html.
194Ted Koppel, These Guns for Hire, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at A25 (quoting officials at the

Pentagon).
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apparent.
What in fact transpired pre-Hamdan, during the preliminary stages of
cases against Guantinamo detainees, confirmed these risks. One
commissioner was revealed to have "served in intelligence operations in the
Middle East, another sent detainees from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay, a
third commanded a Marine who perished in the World Trade Center attack,
and a fourth said he could not with certainty detail the Geneva
Conventions."' 95 A Presiding Officer declined to step down despite questions
about his decades-old friendship with the Appointing Authority.196
Commissioners tried to press forward with trials even while the challenge in
Hamdan was pending before the Supreme Court, and even without a set of
detailed procedural and evidentiary rules by which the commissions could
operate. 97 They did not block transfers of defendants to solitary
confinement.19 8 Two prosecutors assigned to appear before the commissions
resigned in 2004, alleging that the process of choosing whom to charge and
what evidence to provide was aimed at avoiding all danger of acquittal. 199
Defendants were permitted inculpatory outbursts in the courtroom, and some
declared that they would boycott proceedings. 200 In short, as decision in
Hamdan approached, the military commissions lay in a shambles that
undercut claims to independence and impartiality.
(2) Hamdan and Its Aftermath
Though it made no definitive ruling, the Court in Hamdan signaled

195 John Mintz, PresidingOfficer at Guantanamo Faces Questions, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2004, at
A3.
196

Id.

197See Judge Delays Hearing in Terrorism Case, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2006, at A10 (reporting on

intervention of federal civilian judge to stay proceedings in case before military commission until
after decision in Hamdan); Golden, Boycott, supra note 100; Carol J. Williams, Judge Allows
Detainee's Transfer to Harsher Prison, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at A14 [hereinafter Williams,
Transfer]; Carol J. Williams, Defender Says Detainees Should Be Able to Represent Themselves,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2006, at A19 [hereinafter Williams, Defender].
198 See Golden, Boycott, supra note 100; Carol J. Williams, A Dilemma for the Defenders, L.A.

TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006, at All [hereinafter Williams, Dilemma].
199See Jess Bravin, Two Prosecutorsat Guantdnamo Quit in Protest,WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2005, at
Bi; Neil A. Lewis, 2 ProsecutorsFaulted Trials for Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at Al.
200 See Tim Golden, Guantdnamo Terror Suspect Is Given His Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2006, at

A16; Golden, Boycott, supra note 100, Williams, Dilemma, supra note 198; Carol J. Williams,
Detainee Defiantly Admits Charges, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at A9; Williams, Transfer, supra
note 197; Carol J. Williams, Teen Detainee Boycotts His War Crimes Trial, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6,
2006, at A5.

Spring 2007]

PUNISH OR SURVEIL

discomfort with respect to independence and impartiality of the postSeptember 11 military commissions. The Court wrote favorably of the
enactment of the UCMJ, a statute that an earlier Court explained was
201
designed to "guarantee a trial as free as possible from command influence."
In Hamdan the Court described the means by which commission members
were appointed, as well as the procedure for review of commission verdicts. It
further emphasized the Common Article 3 requirement of a "regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples"-guarantees that include independent
and impartial decision makers. 20 2 Kennedy's opinion on behalf of four
Justices expressly included among the "reasons the commission cannot be
considered regularly constituted under U.S. law and thus does not satisfy
Congress' requirement that military commissions conform to the law of war"
the following: "structural differences between the military commission and
courts-martial-the concentration of functions, including legal decision
making, in a single executive official; the less rigorous standards for
composition of the tribunal; and the creation of special review procedures in
place of institutions created and regulated by Congress . . . ." These
to the
differences, Kennedy wrote, "remove safeguards that are important
20 3
fairness of the proceedings and the independence of the court."
The debate on how to proceed post-Hamdan did not pay much attention
to this question. Proposals to embrace the UCMJ would have worked to
improve the independence and impartiality of military commissions for the
reason that the ordinary military justice system, though weakened by the
reliance on military judges at early stages, authorizes review by civilian
judges and, eventually, by the U.S. Supreme Court. 20 4 But the Military
Commissions Act passed in fall 2006 fell short of the pre-Hamdan UCMJ
standard. On the one hand, the Act did abandon the President's plan to have
all cases subject to final decision by the President; on the other hand, it
shunned the ordinary military review process in favor of a Court of Military
Commission Review comprising military personnel and civilians. 205 Decisions
of this brand-new court were made reviewable not by the Court of Appeal for
the Armed Forces-the court most familiar with matters of military justice-

201

Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 141 (1953) (plurality opinion).

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760, 2788, 2795-97 (2006); Third Geneva Convention,
supra note 32, art. 3.
202

Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2807 (Kennedy, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
concurring in part).
203

204

See supra text notes 159-74 and accompanying text.

Compare Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 950a-950f (2006), with Presidential
Order, supra note 1, §§ 4(c)(8), 7(a)(2), at 57835, and MCO No. 1, supra note 187, § 6(H).

205
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but rather by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. 206 The Supreme Court would have discretion to review appeals
20 7
presented to it in petitions for writs of certiorari.
Further marking the post-Hamdan period was the use of various means
to limit the discretion within which courts operate. The Court's judgment
drew criticism, some overt, some less so. In the latter category, Attorney
General Gonzales, after allowing "that threats to the safety of judges or their
families are reprehensible," admonished judges to "understand their role in
our system of government," and expressed "concer[n] that some have lost
208
sight of the role of the Judicial Branch as the Framers intended it to be."
That role, Gonzales suggested, was simply to "uphold laws enacted by
Congress and actions taken by Executive Branch officials," thus "sending a
very clear message to the American people: 'You have chosen this path, and it
is presumed to be the right one because you have chosen it'... activist judges
who take that power into their own hands do not serve the Constitution or
209
the people well."
Congress, meanwhile, outlawed invocation of the Geneva Conventions "as
a source of rights" and, indeed, reliance on any "foreign or international
source of law" as "a basis for a rule of decision." 210 In a rebuff of the Justices'
conclusion that they had the power to review the petition in Hamdan, the
Military Commissions Act further declared:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or
on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has

20610 U.S.C. §§ 950g(a)-(c).
20710 U.S.C. §§ 950g(d).
208U.S. Attorney Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks at the American Enterprise
Institute (Jan. 17, 2007), http:lwww.usdoj.govlaglspeechesl2007/ag-speech_070117.html.
209 Id.

210 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g) ("No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military
commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights."); id. §
5(a) ("No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in any habeas
corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a current or former
officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the United States is a party as
a source of rights in any court of the United States or territories."); id. 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f) (2006)
("no foreign or international source of law shall supply a basis for a rule of decision in the courts
of the United States in interpreting the prohibitions enumerated" the amendments to the War
Crimes Act, discussed supra text accompanying notes 117-23). The provisions were in keeping
with other, recent congressional efforts to thwart judges' consultation of external law as an aid to
interpreting domestic law. See generally Diane Marie Amann, InternationalLaw and RehnquistEra Reversals, 94 GEO. L.J. 1319 (2006).
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been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.211
Stripping of jurisdiction expressly was applied to thwart legal challenges
to the remade military commissions, a fact that led the trial judge who once
had issued a writ in Hamdan's favor now to rule that he had no authority to
hear Hamdan's petition. 212 An appellate court reached a similar result with
21 3
regard to other detainees' habeas petitions.
2.

Rights of the Accused

Even assuming that the Military Commissions Act lawfully deprived
detainees of redress in ordinary federal courts, it remains worthwhile to
examine the plan post-Hamdan. First, detainees will have some opportunity
to mount challenges in the course of their trials; second, there are indications
that the newly elected Congress may act to alleviate the harshest aspects of
the plan. 214 Evaluation thus now shifts to the rights of the accused,
proceeding once again in inverted-pyramid fashion. It begins, at the top, with

211 18

U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1); see also id. § 2241(e)(2). On jurisdiction-stripping as an impediment to
independence and impartiality, see supra text accompanying note 141.
212 Cf.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006) with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.
Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004). See 10 U.S.C. § 950j:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and notwithstanding any other
provision of law (including section 2241 of title 28 or any other habeas corpus
provision), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider any claim or cause of action whatsoever, including any action
pending on or filed after the date of the enactment of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, relating to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a
military commission under this chapter, including challenges to the
lawfulness of procedures of military commissions under this chapter.
Id.

Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007). Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter would have granted a petition for review of the appellate decision.
127 S. Ct. at 1479 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). Justices Stevens and Kennedy
voted to delay habeas review until after petitioner had exhausted other available remedies;
nonetheless, they indicated that they would reconsider if it should turn out that "the
Government has unreasonably delayed proceedings" pursuant to the process described supra text
accompanying notes 205-06, or on proof of "some other and ongoing injury." Id. at 1478
(Statement of Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy respecting the denial of certiorari).
213

See Restoring the Constitution Act of 2007, S. 576, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.restore-habeas.orgRestoringtheConstitution Act. of_2007.pdf; Stephen Labaton,
Court Endorses Curbs on Appeal by U.S. Detainees, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 2007, at Al.
214
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civilian courts, drops a level to courts-martial, and ends with a two-part
discussion of post-September 11 military commissions.
a)

Civilian Courts

In countries with civil law systems, and even in common law countries
like Britain, procedures that officials must follow in the course of criminal
investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and punishment may be found in
legislatively enacted codes. This is not the case in the United States. The
statutes on criminal procedure set forth in the U.S. Code lack the detail of
their counterparts abroad; for example, they do not regulate the conduct of
interrogations. 215 Conversely, however, this code contains a set of rules
intended to encourage a verdict grounded not in bias or emotion, but rather
in the rational consideration of the evidence presented. 216 A single Federal
Rule of Evidence captures the principle animating the entire set of rules:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
217
presentation of the evidence.
In short, even evidence that bears some relation to matters in the case
must be excluded if it is unduly prejudicial or if admitting it would run
218
counter to social policy.
Many significant fair trial guarantees have their source in the
Constitution. A few may be found in the text of that 1789 charter: not only
the right to seek a writ of habeas corpus, 219 but also the guarantee of trial by
jury, 220 the guarantee against prosecution under a law enacted after the

See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3742 (2006), as well as the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (codified at the end of 18 U.S.C.). For criticism of this aspect of the U.S. Code, see, for
215

example, CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION (1993).
216

See FED. R. EVID. (codifiedat the end of 28 U.S.C).

217 FED.

R. EVID. 403.

See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Antidote for an Opponent'sPretrialDiscovery Misconduct:
Treating the Misconduct at Trial as an Admission by Conduct of the Weakness of the Opponent's
Case, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 803 (1993) (discussing reliability and extrinsic social policy
concerns at base of federal evidence rules).
218

219

U.S. CONST. art. I,

220

Id. at art. III, § 3.

§ 9.
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conduct occurred, 221 and the guarantee against conviction for treason absent
either "the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act" or the
defendant's "Confession in open Court." 222 Many other rights are the product
of the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence. This doctrine
construes the Constitution-the Due Process Clauses, in relationship to the
Bill of Rights of 1791-to include a guarantee of fundamentally fair
procedures. 223 As a result of this methodology, defendants are guaranteed,
inter alia, freedom from compelled self-incrimination, 224 and freedom from
conviction on account of evidence obtained either by coercion 225 or by
unreasonable search or seizure. 226 Defendants must be afforded the
assistance of counsel, 227 as well as the rights to be present and confront
adverse witnesses 228 and secure favorable ones, 229 at proceedings that occur
231
speedily 230 and in public.
A linchpin of the fair trial is the defense attorney. Defense counsel is
expected to contest the government from the moment their clients are

221Id. at art. I, § 9.
222Id. at art. III, § 3.
223See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure in an
International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 811-15 (2000) [hereinafter Amann, Convergence]. This
jurisprudence is the offspring of the Court's utilization of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which refers only to the constituent states, as a vehicle for requiring
those states to obey the Bill of Rights, which by its terms constrains only the federal government.
The process of "constitutionalizing" criminal procedure has engendered rich, jurisprudential
articulations respecting these rights, and that fuller understanding applies with equal force to
agents of the United States. See id. at 814 n.29.
224Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964).
225 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936).
226Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
227Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
228Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338 (1970)

(characterizing "the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial" as
"[olne of the most of the basic rights guaranteed by" the right to confront adverse witnesses
enumerated in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, yet holding that right was forfeited by
defendant, whose "noisy, disorderly, and disruptive" behavior made it "exceedingly difficult or
wholly impossible to carry on the trial").
229Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967).

230Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).
231

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 269-73 (1948).
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brought into the criminal justice system until the conclusion of the case.
Obliged to advocate zealously for their clients, defense counsel must remain
free of any interest that could conflict with that obligation. 232 Proof that
counsel failed to afford a client adequate representation justifies the setting
aside of a conviction or sentence. 233 The right to counsel applies equally to
defendants who can afford to retain an attorney and those who cannot. 23 4 In
the federal system, indigent defendants are represented either by full-time
public defenders or by qualified private attorneys. All such counsel are
appointed and paid by an office within the judicial branch of the government,
and so stand apart from the executive branch that is home to federal
235
prosecutors.
This panoply of rights applies as a matter of course to ordinary domestic
crimes. But it is not limited to that context. Rather, the rights apply even if
the alleged conduct occurred outside U.S. territory. They apply as well if the
offense charged threatens security or otherwise has an international
character, such as hijacking, which is proscribed in antiterrorism treaties, for
instance. Until September 11, such cases ordinarily were adjudicated in the
civilian courts, and U.S. judges endeavored to balance the rights of the
accused, the sensitivity of classified information, and the safety of witnesses,
jurors, and court officers. Thus in Bin Laden, a 2001 decision arising out of
out of the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, the court adjusted the
defendants' right of silence in light of the difficulty of securing the presence
of defense counsel at overseas interrogations. 236 The Moussaoui case required
the judiciary to fashion a means to balance the defendant's right to adduce
from other detainees statements that might tend to exculpate him against
the government's claim that to elicit live testimony from those detainees
would present an undue security risk. 237 A federal court resolved questions
relating to the admissibility at trial of classified information in a post-

232The Supreme Court recognized a constitutional dimension in these duties of defense counsel
in its seminal judgment in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
233Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
234 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel
enumerated in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution is a component of fundamental fairness
and thus requires the state to provide poor defendants with attorneys).
235 See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006); Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Service to the Courts,
http://www.uscourts.gov/ao/courts.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).
236United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
237United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 453 (4th Cir. 2004) (reversing district court order to

produce detainee witnesses for live video depositions, and ordering instead that the government
provide written summaries of statements witnesses made during interrogations), cert. denied,
544 U.S. 931 (2005).
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September 11 case against a CIA contractor accused of abuse during
interrogation. 238 One can, of course, criticize the particular balances that
have been struck.239 It is nonetheless notable that these civilian courts did
manage to strike balances and managed to do so via processes that were in
large part open and transparent.
b)

Courts-Martial

The transformation of American military justice in the last half-century
has been called a process of "civilianization." 240 This term is particularly apt
with regard to procedural guarantees and the rights of the accused at courtsmartial.
The same substantive due process doctrine that pertains to civilian
courts has been applied to persons court-martialed under the UCMJ.241 To
cite two examples, military appeals courts have held that servicemembers
are entitled to the Constitution's privilege against self-incrimination 242 and
that they enjoy the constitutional right to cross-examine adverse
witnesses. 243
The UCMJ grants both these rights and a host of others. It mandates
that all court-martial proceedings, except for deliberations and the vote on
the verdict, must take place in the presence of the accused. 244 It makes
explicit that persons subject to court-martial also are entitled, for instance, to

238See Estes Thompson, Despite Early Forecast, CIA Contractor's Trial Has Been Open, AP
ALERT-POLITICAL, Aug. 14, 2006, available at Westlaw, Aug. 14, 2006 APAALERT POLITICS
20:20:36; Jay Weaver, Trial May Shed Light on CIA's Detainee Tactics, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 20,
2006, at Al.
239 For a cogent critique of the compromises made in Moussaoui and in German and British cases
raising similar issues, see Kim Lane Scheppele, The Metastasis of Torture (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/jurisprudence (last visited Feb. 1, 2007);
Kim Lane Scheppele, Evidence from Torture: Dilemmas for Internationaland Domestic Law, 99
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 271 (2005).
240 Eugene R. Fidell, The Culture of Change in Military Law, 126 MIL. L. REV. 125, 125 (1989)
(noting, however, that the term "still makes the occasional senior military lawyer see red").
241 See Gregory E. Maggs, Judicial Review of the Manual for Courts-Martial,160 MIL. L. REV. 96,
146-55 (1999) (collecting military cases on this doctrine).
242 United States v. Kemp, 32 C.M.R. 89, 97 (C.M.A. 1962); see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
243 United States v. Sojfer, 47 M.J. 425, 428 (C.A.A.F. 1998); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
244

Uniform Code of Military Justice § 39(a),(b), 10 U.S.C. § 39 (a), (b) (2007).
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present a defense and to be free from double jeopardy. 245 Supplementing
these statutory rights are detailed articulations of procedure found in the
Manual for Courts-Martial.Also there are rules of evidence that parallel
those applied in federal civilian courts. This is in keeping with the UCMJ
requirement that the Manual, as well as other rules promulgated by the
President, are to apply, as much as "practicable," "the principles of law and
the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the
United States district courts .... -246 In some cases, the Manual sets forth
247
protections with greater specificity than exists in the civilian system.
Courts-martial are subject to the very same prohibition on unduly prejudicial
248
or unreliable evidence.
As for persons designated "enemy prisoners of war" and so entitled to
trial by court-martial, proceedings likewise must conform to the UCMJ and
9
the Manual for Courts-Martial.24
The military regulation, AR 190-8, further
guarantees certain rights explicitly: inter alia, the United States may neither
exert "moral or physical coercion ... to induce" an enemy prisoner of war "to
admit guilt for any act," nor prosecute an enemy prisoner of war "for an act
that was not forbidden by U.S. law or by international law in force at the
time the act was committed." 250
Persons who face trial by court-martial, like their counterparts in the
civilian courts, also enjoy a right to the assistance of counsel. The UCMJ
provides for the assignment of a "judge advocate," a defense attorney who has
been qualified as competent for the task. 25 1 It affords the accused the further
right to retain a civilian attorney, who may proceed alone or in conjunction

Id. §§ 832, 844 (defense and double jeopardy); see id. §§ 832, 844 (self-incrimination and crossexamination).
245

Id. § 836(a); see id. § 836(b) (further stating that "[aill rules and regulations made under this
article shall be uniform insofar as practicable").
246

For instance, Rule 304 of the Military Rules of Evidence that comprise Part III of the courtsmartial. MANUAL, supra note 34, at pt. III. The Manual forbids the use of confessions obtained by
means of "coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement." Id. In contrast, the Federal
Rules of Evidence include no such explicit ban. See Everett, supra note 178 (citing instances in
which the military system offers greater protections for the accused than the civiliarl system).
247

248

See MIL. R. EVID. 403, which is virtually identical to FED. R. EVID. 403.

249

See supra text accompanying note 46.

250

AR 190-8, supra note 41, §§ 3-8(a)-(b).

251

10 U.S.C. § 827.
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with the judge advocate. 252 American courts-martial thus provide, even to
''enemy prisoners of war," the essential guarantees of fair procedure
recognized in the civilian courts of the United States and, for that matter,
25
internationally. 3
c)

Military Commissions

On questions of fair procedure no less than that of independence and
impartiality, the military commissions, both as initially proposed by the
President and as enacted by Congress post-Hamdan, trailed behind the
civilian and courts-martial systems.
(1) Pre-Hamdan
Persons whom the United States detained in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001 have been denied the rights set forth above.
Before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Hamdan in June 2006, the
only forum in which the hundreds held at Guantdnamo could hope to acquit
themselves of claims that they engaged in unlawful combat was the military
commission established by President Bush. 254 His November 13, 2001, order
called for "fair and equitable" trials, and yet made a categorical
determination that it was "not practicable" for military commissions to
proceed according to the procedural and evidentiary rules of the civilian
courts of the United States. 255 Those civilian protections also apply in large
part at regular courts-martial. But the military commission regulations
issued subsequent to the President's order omitted protections, and those
omissions posed grave obstacles to the right of the accused to a fair trial.
First, there was a lack of procedures. Even as the decision in Hamdan
was about to be handed down, the military had failed to publish a procedures
guidebook along the lines either of the Manual for Courts-Martialor federal
rules relating to evidence and criminal procedure. 256 During pretrial

252

10 U.S.C. § 838.

See generally Amann, Convergence, supra note 223; Maggs, supra note 241. Courts-martial lag
behind civilian courts on matters of independence and impartiality, as explained supra text
accompanying notes 159-74.
253

254See supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting inter alia that as of this writing, fewer than

a dozen of the many hundreds in custody at GuantAnamo have been charged with any crime
within the jurisdiction of these military commissions).
255

Presidential Order, supra note 1, § 1(f), at 57833.

See, e.g., Williams, Dilemma, supra note 198, at Part A, para. 11 (reporting a comment by the
head of the GuantAnamo defense team that representation is "extraordinarily difficult' because
256
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proceedings at Guantinamo in April 2006, there had been evident "confusion
over which body of law-military, civilian or international-applies," so that
a Marine lieutenant colonel assigned to defend one detainee told the
commissioners, "[W]hat I desperately want to know here is: What are the
257
rules?"
Second, the procedures that were announced lacked essential protections.
Other systems under review guarantee that a defendant will not be charged
with a crime defined ex post facto, yet the defendant in Hamdan and other
pending commission cases stood charged with conspiracy, a crime unknown
to the international law of war. 258 As for the guarantee of public proceedings,
commission regulations did state a preference for openness. 259 Nonetheless,
the regulations gave a commission's Presiding Officer wide discretion to close
hearings, not only to the public, but also to the defendant and to any defense
attorney except the one appointed by the Department of Defense. 260 The
Presiding Officer was also authorized to keep secret the identities of judges,
witnesses, and other participants. 261 In stark contrast with the lengthy rules
of evidence governing federal criminal courts and courts-martial, the military
commission regulations stated only: "Evidence shall be admitted if ... the
evidence will have probative value to a reasonable person. '262 This lone rule
turned on its head the traditional ban on overly prejudicial or unreliable
evidence, and so created an undue danger of conviction based on unreliable
and unjust evidence. That such evidence exists is not hypothetical given that
many detainees have undergone harsh interrogations. The regulation could
be read to invite evidence extracted in those sessions. The regulation stated
the legal guidance for the commission was 'so vague, so ambiguous and constantly changing").
Williams, Defender, supra note 197. For commentary both on what was and was not spelled
out in the regulations, see generally 1 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, MILITARY
257

COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS SOURCEBOOK (2003); JENNIFER ELSEA, REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS: ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL RULES
AND COMPARISON WITH PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

(Jan. 18, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL316OO.pdf.
258See supra text accompanying note 207 (citing expost facto provision); supra text accompanying
notes 88, 111-13 (discussing conspiracy).
259 See supra text accompanying note 207 (citing expost facto provision); supra text accompanying
notes 88, 111-13 (discussing conspiracy).
260 MCO No. 1, supra note 187, §§ 6(B)(3), 6(D)(2)(d). See also id. §§ 4(C)(3)(b), 6(D)(5) (making

clear that Presiding Officer could exclude civilian defense attorney from certain hearings
notwithstanding security clearance, and further specifying the conditions under which document
containing "Protected Information" could be edited or submitted by substituting another
document).
161

Id., §§ 6(13)(3), 6(D)(2)(d).

262

Id., § 6(D)(1); see Presidential Order, supra note 1, § 4(c)(3), at 57835.
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that "the Accused shall not be required to testify during trial"; however, it
granted no right to remain silent outside of court, and it made clear that the
bar on trial testimony "shall not preclude admission of evidence of prior
statements or conduct of the Accused." 263 The regulation also entertained the
admissibility of others' "unsworn written statements," and it did not prohibit
264
the admission of out-of-court statements obtained by coercive means.
The regulations outlined the defense team permitted to the accused; that
is, either a member of the judge advocate corps chosen by the defendant or a
Detailed Defense Counsel assigned by the Chief Defense Counsel. 265 The
accused could retain a civilian defense lawyer to assist Detailed Defense
Counsel, but only if that lawyer was a U.S. citizen, held a security clearance
of "SECRET or higher," and signed an agreement to comply with all tribunal
rules
and
to permit
government
monitoring
of client-counsel
communications-"for security and intelligence" but not evidentiary,
purposes. 266 The regulation stirred debate within the civilian bar on whether
267
a lawyer could give a client ethical representation under these conditions.
At least one civilian attorney, moreover, was denied the requisite security
clearance. 268
(2) Hamdan and Its Aftermath
Since opening the camp at Guantinamo in January 2002, the Executive

263 See MCO No. 1, supra note 187, § 5(F).
264 Id., § 6(D)(3) (stating only that admissibility is subject to the "probative value to a reasonable

person" standard in id., § 6(D)(1)). Days before oral argument in Hamdan, the Executive issued a
regulation forbidding the military commission from admitting evidence obtained by means of
torture against an accused. Department of Defense Military Commission Instruction No. 10,
Certain Evidentiary Determinations, Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://defenselink.mil/news/
Mar2006/d20060327MCI10.pdf. By its terms, the regulation did not apply to evidence gained
through techniques that constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment but not quite
torture.
265MCO 1, supra note 187, § 4(C), at 4.
266 Department of Defense Military Commission Instruction No. 5, Qualification of Civilian
Defense Counsel, Apr. 30, 2003 § 3(2)(d), at 2-4; Annex B, § II, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissions-instructions.html; see MCO No. 1, supra
note 187, § 4(C).
267 See Mary Cheh, Should Lawyers Participatein Rigged Systems? The Case of the Military

Commissions, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 375 (2005); see also comments by, inter alia, the
American Bar Association, Human Rights Watch, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, and the National Institute of Military Justice, reprinted in 2 NAT'L INST. OF MIL. JUST.
MILITARY COMMISSION INSTRUCTIONS SOURCEBOOK 193-252 (2004).
268

Williams, Dilemma, supra note 198.
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claimed vast discretion to dispose of cases involving persons the President
designated "enemy combatants." Administration officials contended that a
joint resolution passed by Congress a week after September 11 gives the
President almost total control; indeed, at times they asserted that the
President has been acting in a wartime context that gives him plenary power,
not subject to the check-and-balance process incorporated into the structure
269
of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court twice rejected such arguments. In its 2004 judgment
in Rasul, the Court authorized Guantdnamo detainees to pursue habeas
corpus and other legal actions against the government.2 7 0 But that case
turned solely on the question of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and so
the judgment did not rule on what rights detainees may pursue in those
courts. It is true that on the same day the Court held in Hamdi that due
process availed an "enemy combatant" at least of a meaningful hearing
before a neutral decision-maker on the question of detainee status. 271 Yet the
majority made no mention of standards to be applied at a criminal trial. 272
Given that Yaser Esam Hamdi was an American citizen detained in the
United States, moreover, the extent to which the substantive rulings in
Hamdi applied to non-citizens detained offshore remained uncertain. As for
Rasul itself, there was little indication of how the six-member majority would
273
have ruled on the merits.

269See U.S. Hamdan Brief, supra note 184, at 15-23 (asserting both statutory and constitutional

authorization to establish commissions); see also supra text accompanying notes 6-11 (setting
forth the Constitution's division of powers among Congress, the President, and the judiciary); see
supra note 83 (quoting congressional resolution).
270Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
271Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 432 U.S. 507 (2004). Presumably, this proceeding is to correspond with
the hearing before a "competent tribunal" that the Third Geneva Convention and the U.S.
implementing regulation require when there is doubt about whether a captive is a prisoner of
war. Tim Golden, For Guantdnamo Review Boards,Limits Abound, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, §
1, at 20.
272Two dissenters did address this question, for they maintained that the Constitution required

the Executive either to release the petitioner-an American citizen being held without chargeor place him in the custody of the civilian justice system and proceed to trial in the ordinary
criminal courts of the United States. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554-79 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
273The only hint occurred in a footnote:
Petitioners' allegations-that, although they have engaged neither in combat
nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in
executive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the longterm, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access
to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing-unquestionably
describe "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

Spring 20071

PUNISH OR SURVEIL

Two years later, in its decision in Hamdan, the Court stressed that the
President, no less than Congress or the courts, was constrained by law even
in a time of war. 274 In holding that the American 'Constitution and laws,'
including the law of war" required that detainees like Hamdan receive fair
trials, the Court determined that a number of the procedures authorized for
the President's military commissions were fundamentally unfair.27 5 A
plurality rejected the charge of conspiracy on the ground that the crime,
though common in ordinary U.S. criminal courts, is not part of the law of
war. 276 The five-member majority further held it illegal to conduct trial
2 77
proceedings in the absence of the accused.
The post-Hamdan period saw but few alterations of the plan as originally
proposed by the President. The Military Commissions Act retained
conspiracy as an offense punishable by military commission, for example. 278
The Act did place limits on the reasons that a military judge might
permissibly exclude the accused from his own trial; however, discretion
remained to close proceedings to the public. 279 As for evidence, the Act
required the exclusion of statements obtained by torture, yet permitted
admission of statements obtained by other cruel, inhumane or degrading

United States."
Rasul, 542 U.S. at 483 n.15 (quoting the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). Cited in the
footnote is Justice Kennedy's concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
277-78 (1990); for an analysis of that opinion, see Amann, Guantdnamo, supra note 83, at 295-99.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 ("Congress and the President, like the courts,
possess no power not derived from the Constitution."') (quoting U.S. ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317
U.S. 1, 25 (1942)).
274

275Id.

at 2775 (quoting Detainee Treatment
reserved judgment on whether the detainee
only by court-martial. Rather, it held that
common to the Geneva Conventions-and
minimum requirements. Id.
276 Hamdan,

Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1(2005)). The Court
at bar was an enemy prisoner of war subject to trial
at the least he merited the protections of Article 3
that the President's plan did not meet even these

126 S. Ct. at 2775-86 (Stevens. J., joined by Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,

JJ.).
277 Id.

at 2786-93.

Military Commission Act of 2006 § 3(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(25)-(28) (2006). Other offenses
not common to the law of war, such as terrorism and giving of material support to terrorists, also
remained. See generally id. § 950v.
278

279 Id.

§ 949d(d)-(e) (stating that an accused might be removed "after being warned," "to ensure
the physical safety of individuals" or "to prevent disruption of the proceedings," and allowing
closure to the public for reasons of safety or "to protect information the disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security, including intelligence or law
enforcement sources, methods, or activities").
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treatment, if such maltreatment occurred before December 30, 2005.280 Sure
to be a source of confusion to litigants and judges alike, the Act included not
only the brief and permissive rule of evidence found in the President's plan,
but also a provision that tracks the careful and comprehensive evidentiary
28
regulations governing the ordinary military and civilian justice system. '
Congress declared that it had solved the problem posed in Hamdan: "A
military commission established under this chapter is a regularly constituted
court, affording all the necessary 'judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples' for purposes of common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions." 28 2 In truth, however, the Act did little to assuage
Justices' concerns respecting commission procedures.
II.

REINFORCEMENT OF ESTABLISHED PRACTICE

The painstaking exposition of the American way of punishment is offered
here as an essential counterweight to the willy-nilly manner in which policies
were made, and practices changed, since September 11. By long tradition
ordinary judicial mechanisms-civilian courts and courts- martial-were used
to incapacitate persons who posed a threat to the United States. In these
courts were secured the convictions of the de facto ruler of another nationstate, of war criminals, and of sundry bombers, hijackers, and other
terrorists. 28 3 Developments in the substantive and procedural laws of these
two systems enabled judges to accommodate competing interests; that is, to
advance the collective interest of the country while respecting the individual
rights of the accused. 28 4 Measured by criteria of fairness and efficacy,
mechanisms constituting the first prong of established punish-or-surveil
policy had proved their worth.
One would expect a society that embraces the rule of law as vocally as
does the United States to resort without question to such established policy.
Justice Kennedy said as much in his opinion in Hamdan: "The Constitution

110 Id.

§ 948r(b)-(d) (adding that all such statements must appear reliable and probative, and that
admission must serve the interests of justice).
281 Compare id. § 3(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(A) (stating, as did MCO No. 1, supra note 187, §
6(D)(1), that "[e]vidence shall be admissible if the military judge determines that the evidence
would have probative value to a reasonable person") with Military Commissions Act of 2006, §
3(a)(1), 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(A) (requiring the military judge to exclude probative evidence if it
fails the same balancing test in FED. R. EVID. 403, quoted supra text accompanying note 192, and
MIL. R. EVID. 403, discussed supra note 236).
282 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f).

283 See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
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See supra text accompanying notes 213-24.
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is best preserved by reliance on standards tested over time and insulated
from the pressures of the moment."28 5 And yet, that is not what happened
after September 11. Operating on the apparent premise that the attacks
demonstrated the inadequacy of existing mechanisms-a premise that does
not withstand careful consideration of the quality of those mechanisms-the
Executive embarked on a campaign to upend American legal tradition. In
place of prosecution and punishment was put a system of detention, both
28 6
before charges and, perhaps, after acquittal.
Under past practice detention had been considered proper to secure an
accused's presence at a criminal trial, or, in the case of armed conflict, a
captive's absence from combat until war's end. 287 Instances of detention that
deviated from that model, such as the U.S. internment of persons of Japanese
heritage during World War II, widely were seen as unwarranted abuses. 28 8
Notwithstanding, soon after September 11, the President authorized
indefinite detention for interrogation of persons captured during what was
labeled the "global war on terror."28 9 Eventually some 700 persons passed
through the camp at Guantinamo, tens of thousands more were detained
elsewhere, and a few were held at so-called "black sites"; accounts of inmate
abuse surfaced at many of these centers. 290 Arrival at the sites sometimes

285Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
286 On Administration statements respecting the fate of detainees who might be acquitted, see

supra note 184 and accompanying text.
287 See Diane Marie Amann, Interrogation Paradigm, or A Prince Unclothed (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=955430 (last visited Feb. 1,
2007) (setting forth these standard justifications for detention and demonstrating degree to
which post-September 11 practices depart from them).
288 E.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 145 (2001) ("[P]ostwar public opinion

reached the conclusion that the forced relocation and detention of the entire population of ethnic
Japanese on the West Coast was a grave injustice."); see generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR:
THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1993); GEOFFREY R. STONE,
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON
TERRORISM (2004).
289See Presidential Order, supra note 1. Despite the 2002 prediction of a noted wordsmith that

officials would drop this term and its acronym, GWOT, it proved to have staying power. Compare
William Safire, Acronymia Deserves a Loud NIMBY, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 24, 2002, at C8
with Dep't of Defense U.S. Air Force Releases, AETC Commander Addresses Training Changes,
Jan. 10, 2007, 2007 WLNR 546511 (referring to "GWOrT). President Bush used the phrase in his
2007 televised announcement of a plan to send 20,000 additional U.S. troops to Iraq. See 'The
Most Urgent Priorityfor Success in Iraq Is Security,' Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at
A18 (setting forth verbatim transcript of speech).
290Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al
(reporting that officials themselves referred to CIA-led secret prisons as "black sites"); see
generally Amann, Abu Ghraib, supra note 83. President Bush effectively acknowledged
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was preceded by "extraordinary renditions," transfers conducted in
circumvention of established legal frameworks such as extradition. 291 In the
pressures of the post-September 11 moment, Congress, for the most part,
went along with these innovations.
The President's detention order did contemplate that at least some
detainees would one day face trial. 292 Again, however, the President
preferred novelty to tradition. Trial was to take place in a new forum,
eventually called a "military commission," with more than passing similarity
to the nonjury Diplock courts that Britain instituted during the heyday of
political violence in Northern Ireland. 293 The making of a wholly new body of
law for a wholly new institution occurred in fits and starts; the result fell far
short of improving on established policy. Thus it was that in invalidating the
commissions as contrary to the Uniform Military Code of Justice, a statute
Congress had enacted in 1950, members of the Supreme Court took issue
with rules of procedure and evidence, with provisions for independence and
294
It is
impartiality, and with even the offense charged, conspiracy.
October
law
in
unfortunate that the Military Commissions Act that became
maintenance of the secret sites by announcing the transfer of persons detained in them to
Guantdnamo and the consequent suspension-though not elimination--of "the program." White
House, President Discusses Creation of Military Commissions to Try Suspected Terrorists, Sept.
6, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060906-3.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2007). On the overall number of detainees, see FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL To
at
available
at
11,
(Aug.
2004)
OPERATIONS,
DETENTION
DOD
REVIEW
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/dod/abughraibrpt.pdf (visited Jan. 29, 2007) (stating that in the
first three years of the post-September 11 antiterrorism campaign 50,000 persons had been held
in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and at Guantinamo); Paul Garwood, IDs from Guantanamo Raise
Nations' Outcry, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 21, 2006, at A9 (reporting on detainees at Guantinamo).
See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK & CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW
APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS" (2004), available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/
TortureByProxy.pdf Oast visited May 12, 2006); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106. See also Craig Whitlock, Probe of Detainee Transfers Finds Many
CIA Flights, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2006, at A20 (reporting a finding of European Parliament
investigators that as part of a rendition program, more than 1,000 CIA-organized flights had
traveled through European airspace since 2001).
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Presidential Order, supra note 1, § 1(e), at 57833.

On this system see, e.g., JOHN JACKSON & SEAN DORAN, JUDGE WITHOUT JURY: DIPLOCK
TRIALS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1995); Colm Campbell, 'Wars on Terror' and Vicarious
Hegemons: The UK, InternationalLaw, and the Northern Ireland Conflict, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
321 (2005); Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, Making War on Terror? Global Lessons from
Northern Ireland, 69 MOD. L. REV. 935 (2006). Parallels likewise may be drawn with regard to
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See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). See also Amann, Guantdnamo,
supra note 83, at 327-28.
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See supra notes 98-113, 179-81 and accompanying text.
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2006 did little to address these failings-and shameful that in it Congress
stripped detainees of further judicial review. 295 It must be noted, moreover,
that the shortchanging of legal tradition did not achieve its asserted goal of
swift and sure proceedings. As late as the fifth anniversary of the opening of
the camp at Guantdnamo, only a handful of detainees had been charged and
none had stood trial; in contrast, the few persons the government brought to
justice in ordinary criminal courts after September 11 already were serving
long sentences in maximum security prisons. 296 Both before and after the
watershed decision in Hamdan, therefore, military commissions failed to
satisfy criteria of fairness and also, stunningly, the criterion of efficacy on
which the plan was founded.
To this list of failures must be added America's loss of standing. Each
revelation of detainee abuse, each reaffirmation of detention for
interrogation, each reinforcement of the plan for extraordinary military
trials, further eroded the international goodwill that the United States had
earned in World War II and had worked to promote in most of the decades
that followed. Not only U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, but also his more
cautious successor, Ban Ki-Moon, called for closure of Guant~namo. 297 Outcry
was heard not only in parts of the globe long hostile to the United States, but
also in conference rooms and legislative chambers of the United States'
staunchest allies. 298 Increasingly many Americans joined their voices in
protest; however, the official response of the United States remained
dismissive. Examples occurred in summer 2006, when the Committee against
Torture and the Human Rights Committee, which monitor compliance with
treaties to which the United States belongs, called on the United States to
refrain from transferring captives to states where they risked suffering
torture and further to end abuses at Guant.namo. 299 In each case the United

295 See supra notes 116-23, 182-89, 247-51 and accompanying text.
296 See supra notes 65 and 100 and accompanying text.
See Warren Hoge, Revisiting Issue, U.N. Chief Clarifies Death-Penalty Stance, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2007, at A6 (reporting on Ban's agreement with Annan on Guantdnamo, as well as his
more measured position on international law and capital punishment).
297

See Amann, Abu Ghraib, supra note 83, at 2089-90; Amann, Guantdnamo, supra note 83, at
270-76.
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CAT Recommendations, supra note 63 (discussing U.S. report on compliance with the
Convention Against Torture, supra note 61); Human Rights Committee, Advance Unedited
Version, Considerationof Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant,
United States of America, Concluding Observations, 3, 87th sess., (July 10-18, 2006) (discussing
available at
58,
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the ICCPR),
with
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U.S. report
Diane
See
http://www.ohchr.org/englishbodieshrc/docs/AdvanceDocs/CCPR.C.USA.CO.pdf.
Marie Amann, The Committee Against Torture Urges an End to Guantdnamo Detention, ASIL
INSIGHT, June 8, 2006, http://www.asil.org/insights/2006/06/ insights06O6O8.html.
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States refused, asserting that the recommendations evinced a loss of
"perspective and credibility" and were "skewed and reache[d] well beyond
the
scope and mandate of the committee." 300 Such sniping undercut U.S. claims
to global leadership-all for the dubious purpose of defending of a policy that,
it is here argued, advances neither American legal tradition nor American
national security.
Detractors no doubt would point to a case that seems at first glance to
expose the weakness of the instant argument favoring a system of
punishment that accords with accepted fairness standards. That is the case
of thirty-six-year-old, Brooklyn-born Jose Padilla, who had belonged to a
gang while a teenager in Chicago, then later converted to Islam. 301 On May 8,
2002, federal agents arrested him at O'Hare Airport following a trip to
Pakistan. At first held as a material witness, Padilla soon was designated an
"enemy combatant" and transferred to a brig in South Carolina. Attorney
General John Ashcroft told reporters that while abroad Padilla had plotted
with al Qaeda members to detonate radioactive explosives inside the United
States. Known thereafter as "the dirty-bomber," Padilla spent more than
three-and-a-half years in solitary confinement broken only by repeated
interrogation sessions and, as depicted in later-disclosed photographs, at
least one manacled visit to the dentist. He saw no attorney until shortly
before the Supreme Court's 2004 ruling in Hamdi that even an "enemy
combatant" could not be denied access to counsel. 30 2 His indefinite detention
did not end until the Court in 2006 authorized a governmental request to
transfer Padilla to the federal criminal courts and declined to review his
habeas petition for the reason that his executive detention had ended. 30 3

300 U.S.

Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Statement by the United States Mission to the
United Nations on Behalf of the U.S. Delegation to the U.N. Human Rights Committee (July 28,
2006) ("The Committee loses perspective and credibility when it spends more time criticizing the
United States than countries with no civil and political rights."), available at http://www.usmission.chPress2006/0728ICCPR.html; Colum Lynch, Military Prison's Closure Is Urged, WASH.
POST, May 20, 2006, at Al (quoting John Bellinger, Legal Adviser to the State Department, with
regard to Committee against Torture).
301Unless otherwise indicated, the factual account in this and the succeeding paragraph is drawn

from Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Dan Eggen, Padilla Case's Troubles Raise
Questions on Anti-Terror Tactics, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Eggen,
Questions]; James Risen & Philip Shenon, U.S. Says It Halted Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive
Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at Al; Deborah Sontag, Videotape Offers a Window Into a
Terror Suspect's Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at Al.
302 Stevenson Swanson, Padilla Gets to Talk with His Lawyers; 2-year Detainee's 1st Meeting in
Brig Monitored, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 2004, at 1; see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538.
303 Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649 (2006) (denying Padilla's petition for review, with a number
of Justices indicating that they would revisit the case should Padilla be returned to "enemy
combatant" detention); Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S. Ct. 978 (2006) (granting request for transfer). Cf.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (ruling in a 5-4 decision that Padilla's initial habeas
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The criminal case has not seemed a slam-dunk for the Executive. The
federal public defenders assigned to represent Padilla moved to dismiss the
case on grounds of outrageous government misconduct, charging that
throughout executive detention Padilla had been "tortured" in "myriad forms,
each designed to cause pain, anguish, depression and, ultimately, the loss of
will to live."30 4 On account of this mistreatment, Padilla's attorneys
contended that he is incompetent to assist in his defense. But the trial court
ruled Padilla competent, 30 5 and it rejected the government misconduct claim
in mid-April, days before trial was set to begin. 30 6 The prosecution's case
itself posed difficulties. Notably absent from the indictment returned against
Padilla was any mention of the so-called dirty bomb; in its place were rather
vague allegations of nefarious plotting. The federal trial court judge
complained that even these allegations were "very light on facts," and
eventually she dismissed one count against Padilla as duplicitous. 307 "[Firom
Day One, we've never had sufficient admissible evidence to fully prosecute
Jose Padilla," one expert told a reporter. "That's the real problem they have,
308
and it's been a problem from the beginning."
These apparent obstacles do not reveal weakness in the federal criminal
justice system, however. The trial judge's dismissal of one count already has
been reversed on appeal; 30 9 even if the dismissal of one count had been
sustained, a jury well might be persuaded that, as alleged in the other count,
Padilla unlawfully conspired to give material support to terrorists.
Conspiracy is no less the prosecutor's darling today than it was in the time of
Judge Learned Hand. 310 The material support statute is a new arrival in the
petition had been improperly filed).
Eggen, Questions, supra note 301 (quoting Padilla's defense team); see also Songtag,
Videotape, supra note 286.
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Jay Weaver, Padilla Case Said to Lack Evidence, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 3, 2006, at B5; see
United States v. Padilla, 2006 WL 2415946 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2006); Curt Anderson, Assoc.
Press, Feds Want Padilla Charge Reinstated, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 22, 2006, at D5 (noting
that dismissed charge was only one in case punishable by life imprisonment).
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Sontag, In PadillaWiretaps, Murky View of 'Jihad'Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2007, at Al.
309 Curt Anderson, A Key PadillaChargeIs Reinstated,WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2007, at A8.
310 See Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.) (referring to
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prosecutor's nursery, and in any event, terrorism charges are not easily
shaken. 311 Even an acquittal would not, by that fact alone, mean failure.
Built into the American system of criminal justice is a tolerance for acquittal.
A "fundamental value determination of our society," to repeat Justice John
M. Harlan's oft-repeated maxim, is "that it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free."312 This is scarcely less the case when
acquittal results because governmental misconduct has placed certain
evidence outside the bounds of a properly constituted court. Judicial
exclusion of such evidence-indeed, a prosecutorial decision not even to
adduce such evidence-serves the liberty interests both of the defendant on
313
trial and of the society at large.
That conclusion likely will not satisfy those who have pushed these last
years, with considerable success, for a third option, a "new legal regime.3 14
Time and again they have argued that state security requires sacrificing the
human security that lies at the heart of fair-trial guarantees. The argument
presupposes that if a person cannot be convicted fairly, the only thing for
government to do is to convict him unfairly. The assumption ignores certain
curiosities of the post-September 11 campaign. The government has
succeeded in detaining many thousands of persons for as long as it wishes; it
has indicated that it contemplates charges and trials for no more than a few
score of them; and it has reserved the option of continued, post-trial
detention of any captive whom a military commission might acquit. This last
option in particular begs the question of why the government has pushed for
conspiracy as the "darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery"); see also Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 452 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (arguing that the "loose practice" of
charging conspiracy rather than the underlying substantive offense "constitutes a serious threat
to fairness in our administration of justice") Id. at 446.
See Harrison,7 F.2d. at 263. See Abrams, supra note 75 (offering critique of material support
statute). Critical examination of the significance of September 11 remains rare more than five
years after the attacks; a notable exception is David A. Bell, Putting 9/11 into Perspective, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, at M1 (stating, in commentary by historian, a "need to overcome long habit
and remind ourselves that not every enemy is in fact a threat to our existence").
311

312In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
313In addition to numerous condemnations of tainted evidence, dating at least to Bram v. United

States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (reversing murder conviction based on involuntary confession elicited
by government agent), consider, for example, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)
(writing that "an interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty"-justifies
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and shifting the risk of an erroneous verdict onto the
prosecution), and Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that because the
prosecutor "is the representative ... of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done[,]" writes that it is the prosecutor's "as
much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one").
314

Richey, supra note 80. See also supra text accompanying note 80.
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trials at all. Perhaps the push reflects a desire on the part of some officials to
appear fairer by going through the trial-like motions expected of an
increasingly legalistic global polity; perhaps also, a fear that either Congress
or the Court, one day, will put a stop to open-ended executive detention.
To argue that unfair conviction is the only option is to ignore the second
prong of established policy: surveillance. It has long been understood that a
person whom the government suspects but cannot convict of serious crime
does not truly "go free"; rather, the person remains subject to surveillance
conducted within defined boundaries. Though "surveillance" provokes
immediate thoughts of extraterritorial spying, 315 the term refers as well to
domestic investigations by state and federal agents. The law has tolerated
such intelligence gathering, but at a cost. Police may ask questions without
regard to protections set forth in Miranda, for example, but the resulting
statements well may prove inadmissible at a criminal trial.316 The CIA was
accorded greater secretiveness, but on the understanding that its aims
differed from those of police and that its information would not become the
centerpiece of a prosecution case.
Since September 11, the Executive has blurred the line between
intelligence and law enforcement, between surveillance and punishment. It
has intensified questioning and secured itself immunity from federal civilian
prosecution for unduly harsh interrogations. 31 7 It has sidestepped statutorily
established oversight mechanisms while stepping up surveillance within the
United States.3 18 The very fact that September 11 happened is said to prove a

For an exhaustive study of intelligence activities in Afghanistan in the years before
September 11, 2001, see STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS (2004).
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J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (writing that "Mirandahas never
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"[r]ather, the critical question Miranda addresses is who shall bear the cost of securing the
public safety when such questions are asked and answered," and "Miranda,for better or worse,
found the resolution of that question implicit in the prohibition against compulsory selfincrimination and placed the burden on the State").
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317 See supra text accompanying notes 5, 136, 271.

Comprehensive discussion of surveillance is beyond the scope of this Article, which points to
its role as a counterpoint to punishment yet focuses analysis on punishment. For examples of
post-September 11 issues relating to intelligence operations, see Dan Eggen, Records on Spy
Program Turned Over to Lawmakers, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at A2; Eric Lichtblau & David
Johnston, Court to Oversee U.S. Wiretapping in Terror Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at Al;
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Al; supra text accompanying notes 259-60 (discussing revelations about post-September 11 CIA
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need for such radical change. The premise is faulty. Even assuming that the
attacks of that day occurred because of a gap in surveillance, that alone says
little about how well surveillance worked on other days before and after
September 11. The premise simply cannot support the calls for curtailment of
liberties made on its account. One fears, moreover, that overt demands for
greater surveillance capability and overt defense of intelligence activities
well may have had the perverse effect of shrinking intelligence officers'
freedom of covert movement. Surely it has exposed their activities to scrutiny
not seen for decades. These results have left the United States less secureno more free of terrorism, and far less free of warranted criticism from allies
and enemies alike-and gives more reason for return to the established
punish-or-surveil regime.

